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ARTICLE
BRASS RINGS AND RED-HEADED
STEPCHILDREN: PROTECTING ACTIVE
CRIMINAL INFORMANTS
*

MICHAEL L. RICH

Informants are valued law enforcement tools, and active criminal informants—
criminals who maintain their illicit connections and feed evidence to the police in
exchange for leniency—are the most prized of all. Yet society does little to protect active
criminal informants from the substantial risks inherent in their recruitment and
cooperation. As I have explored elsewhere, society’s apathy toward these informants is
a result of distaste with their disloyalty and a concern that protecting them will
undermine law enforcement effectiveness. This Article takes a different tack, however,
building on existing scholarship on vulnerability and paternalism to argue that society
has a duty to protect some vulnerable informant interests. In particular, I assess
informant vulnerabilities against accepted societal norms to determine which
informants deserve greatest protection and balance informant autonomy interests
against informant interests in avoiding harm.
Against this backdrop, I propose safeguards to protect the vulnerable safety and
autonomy interests of active criminal informants that most deserve society’s protection
while minimally interfering with law enforcement effectiveness. The proposals include:
requiring court approval for the use of particularly vulnerable active informants and
prosecutorial consent for the use of all others; providing training for informants and
law enforcement agents in minimizing the risks of harm from cooperation; and folding
informants into existing workers’ compensation schemes.

* Assistant Professor of Law, Elon University School of Law. B.A., University of
Delaware; J.D., Stanford Law School. I am indebted to Andrea Dennis, Melanie Wilson,
Caren Morrison, Andy Haile, Dave Levine, Sonya Garza, and Eric Fink for their
helpful comments, to Amy Minardo for her comments and tireless support, and to
Heather Sangtinette and Erin Stubbs for their research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
1

Informants are critical law enforcement tools, and the active
informant, i.e., one who will continue to acquire information for the
police while maintaining her criminal connections, is the “brass
2
ring” for an agent. Her continuing connections to the criminal
underworld allow for a number of benefits to law enforcement,
including the efficient and effective infiltration of criminal
organizations and the collection of damning evidence against them,
3
all at a diminished cost to law enforcement. But despite their
importance, society treats informants generally, and criminal
4
5
informants specifically, like red-headed stepchildren.
Active
criminal informants are vulnerable to substantial physical, social, and
6
7
moral harm, yet society does little to ensure their safety. Moreover,
informant recruitment is inherently coercive, and there are no
8
safeguards to ensure that informants agree voluntarily to cooperate.
Finally, many active criminal informants possess individual
characteristics, such as youth, mental illness, and drug addiction, that
9
make them particularly vulnerable to coercion and other harm, but
few jurisdictions impose any restrictions on who the police may
10
recruit to cooperate.
1. See JOHN MADINGER, CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT: LAW ENFORCEMENT’S MOST
VALUABLE TOOL 27 (2000) (noting “the tremendous usefulness of informants in
resolving crimes”); STEPHEN L. MALLORY, INFORMANTS:
DEVELOPMENT AND
MANAGEMENT, at ix (2000) (“After 24 years in the profession of drug enforcement,
extensive training, and continuous education, I have reached the same conclusion as
many criminal investigators regarding informants—successful investigations are
dependent on informant development.”); CARMINE J. MOTTO & DALE L. JUNE,
UNDERCOVER 13 (2d ed. 2000) (“Informants are a very necessary part of police work
and most agencies would be at a loss to operate without them.”); see also DELORES
JONES-BROWN & JON M. SHANE, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF
THE USE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS IN NEW JERSEY 3 (2011) [hereinafter ACLU
STUDY] (“In some law enforcement agencies, the research revealed a substantial use
of information from CIs, rather than independent police work, as part of the routine
investigation of drug activity.”).
2. MADINGER, supra note 1, at 29.
3. See infra Part I.A (describing how law enforcement uses criminal informants).
4. Criminal informants are those informants that cooperate with police in
exchange for leniency, often motivated by the fear of incarceration. MADINGER, supra
note 1, at 51.
5. In common parlance, a red-headed stepchild is one “who is neglected,
mistreated or unwanted.” Michael Quinion, Red-Headed Stepchild, WORLD WIDE
WORDS (Aug. 6, 2011), http://www.worldwidewords.org/qa/qa-red2.htm.
6. See infra Part III.A.1 (illustrating the unique societal and situational
vulnerabilities of criminal informants).
7. See infra Part V (explaining the current protections criminal informants
receive and the limitations of such protections).
8. See infra Part III.A.3 (noting how coercion, usually stemming from fear of
criminal sanctions, can be used to recruit criminal informants).
9. See infra Part III.B.
10. See infra Part V.B (detailing the inadequate protections provided to criminal
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Why would society fail to protect such valuable law enforcement
assets? First, informants are treated poorly because, to put it bluntly,
11
society dislikes them. By assisting the police in apprehending their
associates and friends, informants commit the egregious sin of
12
betrayal.
The resulting disdain is heightened with respect to
criminal informants because they are criminals who betray others for
13
the purely selfish purpose of obtaining leniency. Second, though
active criminal informants are valuable to police, they are often
14
fungible.
Though the criminal connections of the low-level
criminals who frequently become informants are useful, many others
15
typically share these criminal connections. Moreover, the benefits
of cooperating with the police are substantial enough to entice a
continuous stream of criminals to cooperate, notwithstanding the
16
risks.
Though society’s disdain for informants is understandable, the
failure to protect them is unjustified. Society has a widely-accepted
17
obligation to protect its most vulnerable members, and informants
informants in their dealings with agents).
11. See, e.g., MOTTO & JUNE, supra note 1, at 13 (“‘Rat,’ ‘squeal,’ ‘stool,’ ‘canary,’
‘fink,’ ‘snitch,’ ‘narc,’ and variations of these words are only a few of the less-than[]respectful terms that have been used to designate one who gives information to
enforcement or investigative agencies.”).
12. See Bret D. Asbury, Anti-Snitching Norms and Community Loyalty, 89 OR. L. REV.
1257, 1269 (2011) (explaining that for an informant to have knowledge of criminal
activity, the informant must have earned the trust of the criminal, a trust the
informant violates); Michael L. Rich, Lessons of Disloyalty in the World of Criminal
Informants, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 16–17), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1722597 (discussing how members of society, especially
in high crime neighborhoods, possess an unfavorable view of informants’ breaches of
loyalty).
13. See ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION
OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 39 (2009) (establishing that the criminal system is relatively
unsympathetic toward criminal offenders); Michael A. Simons, Retribution for Rats:
Cooperation, Punishment, and Atonement, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (2003) (asserting
that criminal informants are like Judas, but are paid in leniency rather than money).
14. On the other hand, high-level criminal informants, such as those glamorized
in popular culture, are difficult, if not impossible, to replace. See, e.g., GOODFELLAS
(Warner Bros. Pictures 1990) (telling the fictionalized story of Henry Hill, a former
mobster who became a government informant); THE INFORMANT! (Warner Bros.
Pictures 2009) (recounting the experience of Mark Whitacre, an executive at Archer
Daniels Midland, who provided the FBI with information about his employer’s
criminal price-fixing scheme). For this reason, witness protection programs are
tailored to protect them. See infra Part V.A (detailing the components of witness
protection programs).
15. See MALLORY, supra note 1, at 8–10 (describing the utility of informant
connections).
16. Estimates have placed the number of informants who are active at any given
time in the hundreds of thousands. See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The
Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645, 657 (2004).
17. See infra Part II.A (describing the political, legal, and philosophical schools of
thought that support society’s duty to protect the vulnerable). The assertion that
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18

This duty is enhanced when an
are often quite vulnerable.
individual’s vulnerabilities are the result of her engagement in
socially-beneficial activities; the active criminal informant’s
19
cooperation falls into that category. It is easy to muster the political
will to protect those who are vulnerable and sympathetic, but society
also must protect those who, like criminal informants, are repugnant
20
to the majority.
But to identify active criminal informants as vulnerable and to
recognize a normative obligation to protect them raises more
questions: Does society have a duty to protect all vulnerable
informant interests? Is there a hierarchy among interests such that
society has a greater duty to protect some more than others? What
should happen when protecting one informant interest endangers
another? In particular, to what extent should society impinge on the
autonomy interests of an informant in order to protect her safety
interests? Finally, if there is a duty to protect some informant
interests, how should society satisfy that duty?
In answering these questions, this Article proceeds as follows. Part
I briefly describes the role of the active criminal informant in the
criminal justice system. Part II explores society’s duty to protect the
vulnerable and examines societal norms suggesting that the
society has a duty to protect the vulnerable must be distinguished from the position
that government has such a duty. The concept of a governmental duty, a special
application of societal duties, was rejected by the Supreme Court in DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
18. Interestingly, the informants who receive the greatest amount of media
attention are often those who are the least vulnerable. A recent example of this
focused media attention is the publicity surrounding the capture of Whitey Bulger, a
Boston gangster and FBI informant who cannot be fairly described as vulnerable. See
Adam Nagourney & Abby Goodnough, Long Elusive, Irish Mob Legend Ended Up a
California Recluse, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2011, at A1. Bulger used his status as an FBI
informant as a cover for his commission of a wide range of crimes over more than a
decade, including drug trafficking, extortion, and murder. See generally United States
v. Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d 141, 175–315 (D. Mass. 1999) (recounting at length
findings of fact regarding Bulger’s time as an FBI informant), rev’d in part sub nom.
United States v. Flemmi, 225 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2000). Bulger’s relationship with his
FBI handler, John J. Connolly, Jr., led to Connolly’s conviction on corruption
charges. See Fox Butterfield, Ex-F.B.I. Agent Sentenced for Helping Mob Leaders, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 17, 2002, at A22. The media attention paid to the few informants, like
Bulger, who effectively game the informant system to their benefit, likely makes
protection of the vast majority of informants even less popular.
19. See infra Part III.B (illustrating the personal characteristics of criminal
informants that may make them even more vulnerable).
20. For this reason, one of the goals of the Bill of Rights was to fulfill society’s
obligation to protect unpopular and minority interests from oppression by the
majority. See Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 501 (1944) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (“The founders of our federal government were too close to oppressions
and persecutions of the unorthodox, the unpopular, and the less influential, to trust
even elected representatives with unlimited powers of control over the individual.”).
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vulnerabilities that result from an individual’s immutable
characteristics or socially-beneficial activities are entitled to the
greatest protection. Part III applies the observations of Part II to the
specific case of the active criminal informant and identifies those
vulnerabilities that are most deserving of protection. Part IV
reconciles the informant’s safety and autonomy interests with
reference to the rich literature on paternalism and argues for a “soft”
paternalistic approach that emphasizes the importance of informed
decision-making by the informant. Part V reviews existing legal
doctrines and statutory schemes and concludes that they provide
insufficient protection for vulnerable informant interests. Finally,
Part VI proposes legislative and law enforcement policy changes to
provide appropriate protections for active criminal informants.
These include requiring court approval for the use of particularly
vulnerable informants and prosecutorial consent for the use of all
others, providing training for informants and law enforcement agents
to minimize the risk of harm to informants, and encouraging law
enforcement to include informants in the scope of existing workers’
compensation schemes.
I.

ACTIVE CRIMINAL INFORMANTS

The term “informant” refers broadly to any civilian who provides
21
information to the police. This Article limits its discussion to active
criminal informants for three reasons. First, the heterogeneity of
informants makes it impossible to discuss their varied interests
22
meaningfully and comprehensively. Second, among all informants
active criminal informants are both numerous and the “most prized
23
by law enforcement.” Third, active criminal informants engage in

21. Michael L. Rich, Coerced Informants and Thirteenth Amendment Limitations on the
Police-Informant Relationship, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 681, 689 (2010).
22. Informants may be referred to by a wide range of cultural tropes, such as
“jailhouse snitches,” “criminal accomplices,” “concerned citizens,” and “innocent
eyewitnesses.” Id. at 689–90.
23. MADINGER, supra note 1, at 28. No hard data exists to detail the precise
extent of informant usage, but estimates place the number of active informants at
any given time in the hundreds of thousands. Natapoff, supra note 16, at 657. Of
these, a majority of them are likely to be criminal informants, as leniency is the most
common incentive used in the recruitment of informants. MADINGER, supra note 1,
at 51; see JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 112 (3d ed. 1994) (“To maintain an informant network, police
must pay off each informer, usually by arranging for a reduction of charge or
sentence or by not acting as a complainant . . . .”). Police literature suggests that
many informants take an active role in investigations. See MALLORY, supra note 1, at 3
(discussing the importance of informants “who can conduct surveillance, testify in
court, identify potential targets, initiate contact with targets, and provide law
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particularly risky activity, both in terms of the threat of physical injury
should they be discovered and the potential for moral harm as they
24
continue to associate with criminals and engage in crime.
Active criminal informants are distinguished from other
25
informants by three characteristics.
First, an active criminal
informant is a criminal. Second, an active criminal informant
cooperates with law enforcement in exchange for some sort of
leniency with respect to her criminal activity, such as a reduction in
sentence or a decision not to prosecute. Third, an active criminal
informant provides information to the police on an ongoing basis by
maintaining her existing criminal connections and developing new
26
ones.
A. Use of Active Criminal Informants
Active criminal informants are most useful to law enforcement
because the threat of criminal prosecution makes them highly
27
motivated in their pursuit of evidence against others, and their
criminal connections permit law enforcement to infiltrate illicit
28
organizations more efficiently and effectively.
Undercover law
enforcement agents must devote substantial time and resources to
infiltrating criminal organizations while exposing themselves to
29
significant risk; even then, they are not always successful. An active
criminal informant can expedite that process significantly by

enforcement with this information, or introduce an undercover agent to these
targets”).
24. See infra Part III (expanding on the vulnerabilities of and risks to criminal
informants).
25. There is no standard terminology used to refer to different kinds of
informants. Thus, the term “active criminal informant” is not a term of art, but
merely descriptive. See MADINGER, supra note 1, at 28 (referring to an “active
informant” as one who “provide[s] information while remaining in position in the
criminal setting”). Moreover, the term “snitch” will be avoided because of the
unhelpful pejorative implications of the word. See Rich, supra note 12 (manuscript at
1–2) (discussing how the term “snitch” plays into a belief from childhood that being
a “tattle-tale” is wrong).
26. See MADINGER, supra note 1, at 28–29 (noting that an informant may have to
commit crimes on the orders of agents). This characteristic distinguishes the active
criminal informant from the cooperator whose assistance is limited to testifying for
the government at trial or providing previously-obtained information to the police.
See generally Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45 VAND. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1992) (discussing cooperation agreements involving the exchange of
leniency for information or testimony).
27. See Rich, supra note 21, at 694 (indicating that when an informant does not
have a specialized motivational interest, police or prosecutors can generally leverage
criminal charges or lengthy prison sentences).
28. MALLORY, supra note 1, at 3–4, 9–10.
29. Id. at 9–10.
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30

vouching for the agent. In some cases, these informants can remove
the need for undercover work entirely by continuing their
involvement in the organization and obtaining evidence of criminal
31
activity directly. They also assist law enforcement by letting police
know about crimes that may never have been detected otherwise and
by using their knowledge of criminal communities to direct police
32
investigations to higher-value targets.
Because active criminal informants are most useful in helping
police infiltrate criminal conspiracies and detect vice crimes, they
have historically been of particular importance in the areas of drug
33
enforcement and organized crime. Active criminal informants are
also increasingly used in counterterrorism efforts and white-collar
34
Nonetheless, active criminal informants are
investigations.
35
employed to investigate all types of crime.
Active criminal
36
informants are a cross-section of criminals : many have mental
30. Id. at 77; MOTTO & JUNE, supra note 1, at 57.
31. MALLORY, supra note 1, at 10.
32. Id. at 8, 13–14.
33. See MALACHI L. HARNEY & JOHN C. CROSS, THE INFORMER IN LAW ENFORCEMENT
12 (2d ed. 1968) (“The short summary of the stated value of the informer from the
prosecution point of view is that he is almost indispensable in narcotics cases. With
this we agree . . . .”); ACLU STUDY, supra note 1, at 3 (reporting that law enforcement
agencies regularly use informants for drug crimes); JAMES Q. WILSON, THE
INVESTIGATORS: MANAGING FBI AND NARCOTICS AGENTS 76 (1978) (“[W]ithout an
informant, few cases can be made at all, and thus the DEA can monitor its agents’
performance by examining case output or undercover buys . . . .”).
34. See MALLORY, supra note 1, at xi (noting the importance of informants in
combating “[r]ising terrorist activity” and “the emerging economic crime wave”);
NATAPOFF, supra note 13, at 30, 154 (explaining that informants brought down white
collar criminals such as Kenneth Lay and that the Department of Justice has
increasingly relied on criminal informants in its white collar division); Wadie E. Said,
The Terrorist Informant, 85 WASH. L. REV. 687, 688 (2010) (noting the rising use of
confidential informants in criminal terrorism prosecutions since September 11,
2001).
35. See HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 33, at 14 (“The fact is that the informer is
valuable to the police in practically every spectrum of crime.”); NATAPOFF, supra note
13, at 26 (explaining the extremes of informants from high-level corporate
executives to drug addicts on street corners). That they are considered to be the
most valuable informants does not mean that the use of active criminal informants
does not have its pitfalls for law enforcement. See NATAPOFF, supra note 13, at 31–38
(detailing some of the problems for law enforcement caused by informants,
including allowing criminals to walk free, enhancing criminality, flouting “the worse
the crime, the worse the punishment” rule, exacerbating racial disparities, allowing
informants to control investigations, corruption, and informant misconduct).
However, even critics of widespread informant use recognize their utility. See id. at
29–31 (explaining how informants enable law enforcement to infiltrate particular
criminal rings and reduce law enforcement costs).
36. See ACLU STUDY, supra note 1, at 10 (noting that no ban exists on using
juvenile informants). For an in-depth discussion of the use of juvenile informants,
see generally Andrea L. Dennis, Collateral Damage? Juvenile Snitches in America’s “Wars”
on Drugs, Crime, and Gangs, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1145, 1147 (2009) (discussing the
ambivalence American society has for juveniles within the criminal justice realm).
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health problems, suffer from mental deficiencies, or are drug
37
addicts. Many criminal informants are on the lower rungs of the
criminal ladder, and law enforcement offers them leniency only if
38
they can deliver evidence against more “valuable” targets.
Along with being the most useful of informants to law
enforcement, active criminal informants also engage in the most risky
39
activity. For instance, the prototypical active criminal informant in
the drug context arranges to purchase contraband from another
40
criminal so that police can apprehend the seller. In other cases, the
informant may wear a wire, join subversive organizations, or even
41
engage in a sexual relationship with a target. These activities are
distinct from other informant activity: they typically require the
active criminal informant to be outside of police protection and in
proximity to the target of the investigation, risking immediate and
violent retribution should the informant’s cooperation be
42
discovered. Moreover, those low-level informants seeking evidence
against “big fish” may find themselves out of their depth, involving
43
targets who are more serious criminals and prone to violence.
37. See ACLU STUDY, supra note 1, at 51–53 (detailing a community survey in
which drug-addicted respondents and those with mental health issues reported
working as informants). Though these informants pose additional risks for the
police, their use is viewed as inevitable because of the frequency of mental health
and drug abuse problems among criminals. See MADINGER, supra note 1, at 186–90
(elaborating on the use of addicts and those with mental health problems as
informants); MALLORY, supra note 1, at 25 (discussing “restricted use informants,”
including juveniles and drug addicts).
38. See Robert P. Mosteller, The Special Threat of Informants to the Innocent Who Are
Not Innocents: Producing “First Drafts,” Recording Incentives, and Taking a Fresh Look at the
Evidence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 519, 556 (2009) (explaining how “big fish” (the
criminal organizers) can implicate more “little fish” (agents of the crime) but “little
fish” can deliver the more valuable “big fish”).
39. This is not to say that informants who only provide information or testify on
behalf of the government are not subject to harm. See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S.
300, 308 (1967) (noting the importance of anonymity to all informants who fear
harm to themselves and their family).
40. See MALLORY, supra note 1, at 77 (listing purchasing contraband as one of the
common tasks of informants); MOTTO & JUNE, supra note 1, at 57 (describing how an
informant can set up a “buy-bust” by paying for drugs with marked money).
41. Rich, supra note 21, at 691.
42. See Alexander v. DeAngelo, 329 F.3d 912, 918 (7th Cir. 2003) (recognizing
the informant’s “usual risk of being beaten up or for that matter bumped off by a
drug dealer with whom one is negotiating a purchase or sale of drugs in the hope of
obtaining lenient treatment from the government”); Susan S. Kuo, Official
Indiscretions: Considering Sex Bargains with Government Informants, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1643, 1661–62 (2005) (discussing the risks of physical harm to informants).
43. See, e.g., ACLU STUDY, supra note 1, at 11 (“[M]ere motor vehicle traffic
violators were used in some cases to infiltrate criminal enterprises run by interstate
drug traffickers.”); Rich, supra note 21, at 681–83 (detailing the case of Rachel
Morningstar Hoffman, a confidential informant and low-level marijuana dealer who
was killed during the purchase of ecstasy, cocaine, and a handgun—a transaction
that she arranged at the instruction of her police handlers).
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B. Recruitment of Criminal Informants
Recruitment of active criminal informants typically occurs without
44
the oversight of courts or the involvement of defense counsel.
Police attempt to recruit informants immediately after, or sometimes
in lieu of, their arrest, as this is when the potential informant is most
45
afraid of jail time and thus most likely to agree to cooperate. To
best utilize an arrestee’s fear of punishment as an incentive to
cooperate, police emphasize the maximum penalties that the
potential informant might face and suggest that cooperation is her
46
only option to avoid those penalties. In some cases, police may even
bluff by threatening charges for which there is insufficient evidence
47
Because defense counsel may discourage a potential
to convict.
informant from cooperating or try to extract a better bargain for her
48
client, police will sometimes discourage their involvement.
The
agreements between police and informants also are often informal
49
and rarely memorialized in writing.
In some cases, prosecutors negotiate with the potential informants
instead of the police as police are limited in what they can deliver to
an informant. When a potential informant has just been arrested and
no charges have been filed, police can truthfully promise not to
50
disclose her most recent crime to the prosecutor if she cooperates.
51
But the police typically lack the authority to bind prosecutors, so the
44. See NATAPOFF, supra note 13, at 16 (contrasting the constitutional protections
that criminal defendants receive to the lack of protections informants receive).
45. See ACLU STUDY, supra note 1, at 12, 54 (discussing the street-level and arrestrelated recruitment of informants); Rich, supra note 21, at 694 (stressing the
uncertainty about consequences that leads arrestees to be likely to agree to
cooperate).
46. See Rich, supra note 21, at 696 (explaining that officers emphasize the
maximum penalties to secure informants); see also ACLU STUDY, supra note 1, at 10
(“Police ‘squeeze’ criminal defendants by threatening them with additional charges
or counts related to their own cases if they do not ‘cooperate’ by becoming
[informants].”).
47. See ACLU STUDY, supra note 1, at 52–53 (reporting that the police threaten to
plant incriminating evidence on witnesses or charge them with crimes like
obstruction of justice or hindering prosecution if such witnesses fail to provide or
gather evidence for the police); Rich, supra note 21, at 696 (noting that the police
will discourage defendants from speaking to attorneys).
48. Rich, supra note 21, at 696.
49. See NATAPOFF, supra note 13, at 19 (noting that many agreements are verbal
and may be written down later); see also ACLU STUDY, supra note 1, at 11 (explaining
that while written cooperation agreements are required by New Jersey guidelines, the
mandate is rarely followed).
50. See NATAPOFF, supra note 13, at 18–19 (asserting that the police may bluff to
convince a potential informant to cooperate).
51. See Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 780 n.140 (2003) (collecting cases); see also Joaquin J.
Alemany, Comment, United States Contracts with Informants: An Illusory Promise?, 33 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 251, 260–66 (2002) (same). But see United States v. Carrillo,
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relevant prosecutor must be involved if the informant is to negotiate
a valid and binding cooperation agreement for leniency on charges
that are either under investigation or have already been filed. If the
negotiations involve pending charges, the potential informant has a
52
constitutional right to have counsel involved. However, the right to
counsel typically does not attach until formal charges are brought
53
Thus, prosecutors are free to
against a potential informant.
negotiate cooperation agreements with potential informants without
54
providing them with an opportunity to consult with counsel.
Even where an informant has negotiated with a government
representative who has the authority to bind the State, cooperation
agreements typically vest substantial discretion in government agents
to determine whether the informant has met her obligations and is
55
thus entitled to the promised leniency.
Moreover, because a
prosecutor cannot bind a court’s sentencing discretion, the offered
leniency is usually limited to a promise to convey the fact of the
informant’s cooperation to the sentencing tribunal and to seek a

709 F.2d 35, 37 (9th Cir. 1983) (upholding dismissal of drug charges based on a
finding that the defendant fulfilled the terms of cooperation agreement with DEA
agents, who promised that he would not be prosecuted). Occasionally, courts find
that the apparent authorization by a government agent of an informant’s criminal
activity is a defense to charges arising from that activity. See, e.g., United States v.
Abcasis, 45 F.3d 39, 43–44 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that a defendant could claim
entrapment by estoppel if he reasonably relied on representations by a government
agent that his criminal activity was authorized as part of a cooperation agreement).
52. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 (1985) (recognizing that denying
access to counsel before trial may be extremely damaging to the fate of the accused).
53. See United States v. Moody, 206 F.3d 609, 616 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach at pre-indictment plea
negotiations).
54. Though some prosecutors’ offices may have formal or informal policies
requiring the presence of counsel, it is implausible that, in the absence of some
constitutional or statutory prohibition, some prosecutors would not meet with
potential informants outside of the presence of defense counsel. See id. (upholding
pre-indictment negotiations where counsel was not present).
55. For instance, the United States Sentencing Guidelines give the prosecutor
discretion to decide whether to file a motion for a downward departure in light of
the defendant’s “substantial assistance” to the government, bounded only by
constitutional limitations. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2011); see
Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185–86 (1992) (asserting that a court may
examine the substantial assistance motion if the refusal implicates the Constitution).
Similarly, the requirements of most cooperation agreements specify only that the
informants must render “full cooperation” or its equivalent to receive leniency. See
Hughes, supra note 26, at 47 (citing United States v. Brown, 801 F.2d 352, 353 (8th
Cir. 1986)) (noting the requirement of full cooperation from the defendant for
immunity). Whether informants have met that standard is the subject of a steady
stream of litigation that rarely ends in the informant’s favor. See Ian Weinstein,
Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 563, 589–91 (1999) (examining the
varying interpretations courts have used to address substantial assistance motions,
each of which generally favors the government).
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56

lower sentence. Should the court disagree with the prosecutor’s
recommendation or adjudge the informant’s cooperation
57
insufficient, the informant is left with little recourse.
C. Disdain for Active Criminal Informants
Though active criminal informants play a crucial role in law
enforcement, they are subject to widespread societal disdain. In
society’s eyes, the first mark against them is that they are criminals.
By engaging in criminal activity, the informant becomes a
marginalized “other” whose claims on basic rights, such as housing,
58
employment, voting, and sustenance, are lost or severely curtailed.
This demonization of the criminal is reinforced by the
59
sensationalizing of crime in the news media and popular culture.
The distaste is compounded in the case of the criminal informant
because she betrays her criminal compatriots when she cooperates
60
with the police and does so for selfish reasons. She is, in common
61
parlance, a “snitch,” a “squealer,” and a “rat.” This perception of
the informant as disloyal is particularly strong in the high-crime
communities that are most marginalized from mainstream society
62
and in which active criminal informants are likely to live.

56. See Weinstein, supra note 55, at 588, 591–92 (explaining that defendants are
held to their agreements but the decision to mitigate sentences lies ultimately within
the court’s discretion).
57. See id. at 592 (emphasizing that the court’s decision on whether to mitigate
the sentence is unreviewable).
58. See Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting
Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 489–94 (2010) (explaining the
collateral consequences for individuals in the U.S. with criminal convictions in
housing, voting, employment, and public benefits); see also Alec C. Ewald, “Civil
Death”: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disenfranchisement Law in the United States,
2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1074 (describing John Locke’s view that “one who commits a
crime forfeits his right to participate in the political process—if not his rights to
property and person”).
59. See Craig Haney, Media Criminology and the Death Penalty, 58 DEPAUL L. REV.
689, 729 (2009) (“[B]eyond reinforcing the master crime narrative by
individualizing and decontextualizing crime, media criminology consistently
dehumanizes and demonizes perpetrators and effectively exoticizes their
criminality.”); Lynne Henderson, Revisiting Victim’s Rights, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 383,
395 (“The news media keeps up a steady drumbeat of crime⎯‘if it bleeds, it
leads’⎯and portrays criminal defendants as unworthy and less than human.”).
60. See Rich, supra note 12 (manuscript at 13–17) (discussing how society views
the accomplice-informant negatively because of perceived self-serving motives).
61. See Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 570 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (listing cultural terminology used to describe informants to demonstrate
that these individuals offend social values of loyalty and personal privacy).
62. For instance, the perception of informant disloyalty lies at the heart of the
“Stop Snitching” movement, which discourages even law-abiding citizens in these
communities to cooperate with the police. Rich, supra note 12 (manuscript at 17–
28).
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The broader societal disdain of criminal informants is magnified
within the law enforcement community, which generally views
63
informants “with aversion and nauseous disdain.” Police officers
have such a well-developed sense of loyalty that they punish severely
64
those officers who are perceived to be disloyal.
It is thus
unsurprising that in handling informants, police are cautioned to
65
mask their distaste of the informant’s disloyalty. Both police and
prosecutors frequently speak of the informant as being, at best, a
66
“necessary evil.” Indeed, a popular aphorism used frequently by
prosecutors to explain to juries their use of criminal informants as
witnesses is instructive of the law enforcement perspective on
criminal informants: “[i]f you are going to try the devil, you have to
67
go to hell to get your witnesses.”

63. Richard C. Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and
Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1093 (1951). This background distaste for the
informant does not mean that police officers and prosecutors never come to like
individual informants with whom they deal on a personal level. Indeed, police are
cautioned for good reason against becoming too friendly with their informants,
particularly those of the opposite sex. See MADINGER, supra note 1, at 185–86
(discussing the risks of informants becoming romantically involved with their
contacts). Rather, the assertion is that active criminal informants specifically are
disliked as a class by prosecutors and police officers, even though individual
government agents may develop a personal affinity for individual informants.
64. See Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of Silence” as Evidence of Bias
and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233, 256–61
(1998) (discussing the ostracism, retaliation, and physical violence suffered by police
who report wrongdoing by other officers); see also MALLORY, supra note 1, at 17
(“This code of silence is even upheld in many law enforcement entities. Covering
for a partner or not disclosing illegal activity is all too common in the police
community.”).
65. See MALLORY, supra note 1, at 28 (cautioning that “[r]eferring to informants
as damn snitches, scum bags, rats, etc. . . . are not very effective methods to obtain
accurate information”); MOTTO & JUNE, supra note 1, at 58–59 (“It has been said a
thousand ways. Police officers should handle informants with respect and refrain
from using the word ‘informer’, ‘squeal’, ‘rat’, ‘narc’, ‘stool’ or other similar
derogatory descriptions.”).
66. MALLORY, supra note 1, at x; see John Monk, Did Freeing Accused Killer Lead to
Murder?, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Aug. 7, 2011, at B2 (quoting a prosecutor who
described releasing one criminal to catch another as “a dirty business”).
67. This maxim comes in many forms, all of which essentially equate criminal
informants to denizens of hell. See, e.g., Belisle v. State, 11 So. 3d 256, 303 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2007) (quoting a prosecutor’s opening statement in which he stated:
“[u]nfortunately, sometimes if you want to get the devil, you’ve gotta go to hell for
witnesses”); Moore v. State, 820 So. 2d 199, 207 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam) (quoting a
prosecutor for the aphorism: “[c]rime conceived in hell will not have any angels as
witnesses”); Monk, supra note 66 (quoting a prosecutor who said, “[w]hen you want
to convict the devil, sometimes you got to go to hell to get the witnesses”).
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II. PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE
A. Society’s General Duty to Protect the Vulnerable
The protection of the vulnerable is one of the principal duties of
68
society and a foundational goal of the legal system. Support for the
existence of this duty is found in various schools of political, legal,
and philosophical thought. Natural law, for instance, includes an
individual’s right to life, liberty, and security and imposes an
69
obligation on governments to protect those rights. Social contract
theory teaches that the government takes on the duty to protect its
citizens in exchange for the citizen’s surrender of some measure of
70
their inherent freedom.
Social justice theory instructs that the
government must protect the liberty of all citizens and must protect
that liberty fairly, regardless of an individual’s social or political
71
status.
From the legal standpoint, society’s duty to protect the
vulnerable is often conceived as the State’s parens patriae power and
obligation to protect the vulnerable, such as children and the
72
mentally ill.
Those arguing for changes in positive law to protect various subgroups often cite society’s duty to protect the vulnerable to justify
their efforts. Children’s advocates argue for the expansion of legal
doctrines and the enactment of legislation to protect children on the
ground that they are among the most vulnerable members of
68. See Samuel L. Bray, Power Rules, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1172, 1172 (2010)
(discussing the government’s duty to protect the vulnerable); Michael L. Rustad &
Thomas H. Koenig, Reforming Public Interest Tort Law to Redress Public Health Epidemics,
14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 331, 373 (2011) (same).
69. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, pmbl. para.
3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (asserting that human rights should be
protected by the law); see also Laura Moranchek Hussain, Note, Enforcing the Treaty
Rights of Aliens, 117 YALE L.J. 680, 720 (2008) (noting that international recognition
of human rights goes beyond U.S. constitutional protections for aliens and are
inherent in personhood).
70. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 170 (G.A.J. Rogers & Karl Schuhmann eds.,
Thoemmes Continuum 2003) (1651) (arguing that an individual must cede control
to the sovereign for stability).
71. See SAM SOURYAL, ETHICS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: IN SEARCH OF THE TRUTH 189–91
(3d ed. 2003) (detailing John Rawls’s ethical theory, which is based on a
presumption of equality); Janet Thompson Jackson, What is Property? Property Is Theft:
The Lack of Social Justice in U.S. Eminent Domain Law, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 63, 74–75
(2010) (explaining John Rawls’s Theory of Justice, which perceives fairness as a
balancing of claims).
72. See Mary Patricia Byrn & Jenni Vainik Ives, Which Came First the Parent or the
Child?, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 305, 322 (2010) (noting that the parens patriae power is
most commonly utilized to separate a child from his parent); Elizabeth Weeks
Leonard, State Constitutionalism and the Right to Health Care, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1325,
1370–71 (2010) (explaining parens patriae for children and other legally incompetent
persons).
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73

society. Arguments for expanded protection of the mentally and
physically disabled also rely on the notion that their vulnerability
74
gives rise to enhanced societal duties. Similar arguments are used to
75
advocate on behalf of legal protections for the elderly and for
76
various immigrant groups.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has
recognized that the protection of vulnerable groups is a legitimate
77
governmental interest in a variety of contexts.
B. Defining Vulnerability
Though the term “vulnerable” is often used to describe those we
78
normatively wish to protect, it is rarely clearly defined.
As used
herein, a specific instance of an individual’s vulnerability is defined
by two variables. One must identify first what the individual is
79
vulnerable to.
In other words, to what harm is the individual
susceptible? The harm can be physical, but can also involve less
tangible “interests,” such as one’s psychological or economic well80
being. Additionally, vulnerability is defined by whom the individual
81
is vulnerable to. Put another way, who, through their action or

73. Jessica R. Feierman & Riya S. Shah, Protecting Personhood: Legal Strategies to
Combat the Use of Strip Searches on Youth in Detention, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 67, 88 (2007);
Janet Weinstein & Ricardo Weinstein, Before It’s Too Late: Neuropsychological
Consequences of Child Neglect and Their Implications for Law and Social Policy, 33 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 561, 577 (2000).
74. See Pamela Fadem et al., Attitudes of People with Disabilities Toward PhysicianAssisted Suicide Legislation: Broadening the Dialogue, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 977,
980–81 (2003) (detailing two Supreme Court cases where people with disabilities are
recognized as an at-risk group).
75. See Arthur Meirson, Note, Prosecuting Elder Abuse: Setting the Gold Standard in
the Golden State, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 432 (2008) (arguing that elder populations
should be protected because of their unique vulnerability).
76. See Alexander Betts, Soft Law and the Protection of Vulnerable Migrants, 24 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 533, 535 (2010) (explaining that migrant groups are particularly
vulnerable to exploitation).
77. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997) (upholding a
ban on assisted suicide by relying, in part, on a governmental interest in protecting
vulnerable groups, including the poor, the elderly, and the disabled, from coercion,
prejudice, and societal indifference); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 332 (1993)
(recognizing that “‘the state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers
in providing care to its citizens who are unable . . . to care for themselves’” (quoting
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979))); W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379, 394–95 (1937) (holding that freedom of contract could be restricted in
order to protect vulnerable groups).
78. See, e.g., Carl H. Coleman, Vulnerability as a Regulatory Category in Human
Subject Research, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 12, 12 (2009) (criticizing the imprecise use of
the term “vulnerability” in human subject protection regulations).
79. ROBERT E. GOODIN, PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE: A REANALYSIS OF OUR
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES 112 (1985).
80. The specific question of what counts as an individual’s “interest” such that it
might be deserving of protection is itself a normative question. Id. at 111.
81. Id. at 112.
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inaction, can cause the individual the harm to which she is
susceptible?
This bifurcated definition of vulnerability suggests two observations
relevant to the criminal informants. First, an individual is vulnerable
both to a person affirmatively threatening her with harm as well as to
82
a person capable of protecting her from harm. For instance, the
victim of a mugging is vulnerable both to the mugger who can cause
her injury by firing his gun and to the passerby who witnesses the
crime and could prevent the harm by alerting the police. Second,
this definition means that all people are vulnerable in many ways, in
that every person is susceptible to harm from the action or inaction
83
of a variety of people. For example, one person may be vulnerable
simultaneously to, inter alia, emotional injury from her loved ones,
physical injury from the drivers of nearby vehicles or passing
pedestrians, and economic injury from her employer or the manager
of her investments.
C. Identifying the Vulnerabilities Entitled to Society’s Protection
If every person is vulnerable, then it is both unfeasible and
undesirable for society to protect all people against each vulnerability
84
they face. One must therefore determine how society should decide
which vulnerabilities to protect. Answering this question requires a
normative analysis that must be undertaken on a case-by-case basis.
82. Id.
83. See Bray, supra note 68, at 1173 (distinguishing vulnerability to direct harm
from vulnerability to power); Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject:
Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 1 (2008)
(arguing that “vulnerability is—and should be understood to be—universal and
constant, inherent in the human condition”).
84. First, protecting one individual from vulnerability inevitably interferes in
some way with the interests of another, at a minimum because it requires the
redirection of society’s limited resources. Moreover, there are vulnerabilities that
society, acting through its government, is ill-suited to protect individuals from
because, for instance, they may be difficult to predict or the heavy hand of
government intervention may be inappropriate to address them. See, e.g., Kyle
Graham, Why Torts Die, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 359, 406–30 (2008) (discussing the
demise of “heartbalm” torts and noting that it resulted, at least in part, from
practical difficulties of measuring damages and discouraging frivolous suits); Alon
Harel & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Hate and Equality, 109 YALE L.J. 507, 510 (1999)
(arguing that even in the limited arena of vulnerability to crime, vulnerabilities that
arise from certain factors, such as simple bad luck, do not demand state protection).
Finally, government efforts to protect everyone against all vulnerabilities would
almost certainly be viewed as unacceptably paternalistic. See Leslie Bender, Feminist
(Re)Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, 1990
DUKE L.J. 848, 889 (“Although the motivation for paternalistic intervention may be
altruistic, it inevitably involves an element of autonomy-deprivation for the
‘protected’ party.”). For a discussion of paternalism concerns in the informant
context, see infra Part IV.
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Nonetheless, two widely-accepted societal norms are useful in
undertaking this analysis in the criminal informant context. First,
society generally provides greater protection to unchosen
vulnerabilities than to those that arise from an individual’s voluntary
and intelligent choices. Second, engaging in socially-beneficial
activity typically entitles an individual to greater protection from
resulting vulnerabilities.
1.

The importance of choice
85
The liberal ideal of equality suggests first that “all men are
86
created equal” and thus are entitled to equal protection under the
87
law, particularly with respect to personal characteristics over which
88
one has little or no control. Similarly, the liberal tradition of
89
respecting an individual’s autonomy suggests that an individual is
entitled to less protection from the negative repercussions of
90
decisions that are a product of her free will. With these liberal
ideals in mind, society undertakes an enhanced duty to protect
individuals from vulnerabilities that arise from what can be called,
borrowing from equal protection law, immutable characteristics and
85. See Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1,
49–50 (2010) (asserting that it would violate equality norms for similar offenders to
be given disparate punishments).
86. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and
the pursuit of Happiness.”).
87. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (requiring that disparate government treatment be justified, at
a minimum, by a rational relationship with some legitimate government interest).
88. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006)
(prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin”); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006)
(prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of disability); Parham v.
Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979) (plurality opinion) (recognizing enhanced
protection against state action on the basis of “immutable human attributes,” such as
national origin, illegitimacy, and gender); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
3A1.1(a) (2010) (mandating a sentencing enhancement when a defendant selects a
victim on the basis of “perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity,
gender, gender identity, disability, or sexual orientation”).
89. See Thaddeus Mason Pope, Counting the Dragon’s Teeth and Claws: The
Definition of Hard Paternalism, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 663–64 (2004) (discussing the
liberal tradition of autonomy).
90. For instance, the criminal law punishes only those actions that are the result
of an individual’s free and voluntary choice. See Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause
and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 326–27 (1985)
(“Central among the beliefs that underlie the criminal law is the distinction between
nature and will, between the physical world and the world of voluntary human
action. . . . Voluntary human actions are not seen as the product of relentless forces,
but rather as freely chosen expressions of will.”).
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a diminished duty to protect individuals from vulnerabilities arising
91
from an exercise of free will.
This clean-sounding dichotomy masks some difficult line-drawing
issues, however.
First, the concept of immutability is itself
92
surprisingly malleable.
The most clearly “immutable” personal
characteristics are those that could be described as pure coincidences
of birth over which an individual truly has no control, such as race,
93
color, national origin, genetic makeup, and disability. But society
also provides enhanced protection against discrimination on the basis
of attributes that are central to an individual’s identity, even though
94
they might be mutable in fact, such as religion or gender. The
decision to protect this latter group of characteristics is based on a
normative judgment that they are either so difficult to change or so
central to the individual’s identity that society should not expect
95
them to be changed.
Moreover, some vulnerabilities arise from choices, such as hairstyle,
clothing, or language, that are expressions of an individual’s
96
immutable characteristics.
Others stem from characteristics,
including poverty, homelessness, obesity, and drug or alcohol
addiction, that can be exceedingly difficult to change but are at least
97
in part the result of past choices.
Empirical questions about
91. See Miranda Perry Fleischer, Equality of Opportunity and the Charitable Tax
Subsidies, 91 B.U. L. REV. 601, 632 (2011) (recognizing that all liberal egalitarian
theories “tolerat[e] unequal outcomes due to choices” and do not tolerate “unequal
outcomes stemming from the chance circumstances of one’s birth”); Alon Harel,
Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law: The Case for a Criminal Law Principle of
Comparative Fault, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1181, 1204–07 (1994) (arguing that individuals
whose vulnerability to crime arises from involuntary factors should receive enhanced
protection from crime). But see Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection:
The Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485, 490
n.14, 509–19 (1998) (contributing to criticism of immutability as a basis for
enhanced equal protection scrutiny).
92. See Sharona Hoffman, The Importance of Immutability in Employment
Discrimination Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1483, 1511–13 (2011) (discussing two
primary definitions of “immutability” within Supreme Court and appellate court
decisions).
93. Id. at 1515.
94. Id. at 1517–18.
95. Id. at 1517.
96. Most famously, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
rejected a challenge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to an American
Airlines policy that prohibited certain employees from wearing their hair in braids.
Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 232, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The court
reasoned that the wearing of hair in braids is an “easily changed characteristic,” i.e. a
choice, and thus not an immutable characteristic protected by Title VII. Id. at 232.
Scholars have pointed out how this analysis fails to appreciate the complex interplay
between the choice made by Rogers to braid her hair and her immutable status as an
African-American woman. E.g., Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the
Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365.
97. See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1137 (9th Cir. 2006)
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whether a particular vulnerability is the result of an individual’s
choice or is an accident of her birth can also muddy the waters. For
example, the debate between supporters and opponents of
protections based on sexual orientation often is framed as a factual
98
question of whether sexual orientation is a choice.
Similar
questions arise about genetic predisposition for other vulnerabilities,
99
such as drug addiction and obesity.
Though the existence of these issues complicates how choice
impacts the determination of the extent of society’s obligation to
protect against a given vulnerability, the principle that choice matters
remains.
More specifically, society’s responsibility is inversely
proportional to the strength of the causal relationship between an
100
individual’s voluntary choice and the vulnerability at issue.
(“[G]enerally one cannot become a drug addict or alcoholic, as those terms are
commonly used, without engaging in at least some voluntary acts (taking drugs,
drinking alcohol). Similarly, an individual may become homeless based on factors
both within and beyond his immediate control, especially in consideration of the
composition of the homeless as a group: the mentally ill, addicts, victims of domestic
violence, the unemployed, and the unemployable.”), vacated, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir.
2007).
98. Compare Frederick M. Lawrence, The Evolving Federal Role in Bias Crime Law
Enforcement and the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 251,
264 (2008) (“First, there is much evidence that sexual orientation is indeed
immutable, whether for genetic reasons alone, or some combination of genetic and
environmental reasons. Even if this evidence is not conclusive, there is certainly no
scientific basis to conclude that sexual orientation is a matter of personal choice.”
(footnote omitted)), with Rena M. Lindevaldsen, The Fallacy of Neutrality from
Beginning to End: The Battle Between Religious Liberties and Rights Based on Homosexual
Conduct, 4 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 425, 456 (2010) (contending that unlike “race or
national origin,” which are “immutable characteristics,” sexual orientation is not
treated as a suspect classification because there is “at a minimum, some element of
choice”).
99. See Linda C. Fentiman, Rethinking Addiction: Drugs, Deterrence, and the
Neuroscience Revolution, 14 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 233, 246–47 (2011) (discussing
contrasting theories as to whether drug addiction involves individual choice); Allison
K. Hoffman, Three Models of Health Insurance: The Conceptual Pluralism of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1873, 1930 (2011) (taking note of
studies suggesting genetic or socioeconomic predispositions to smoking and obesity).
100. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962),
and Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (plurality opinion), are helpful in illustrating
the importance of the presence or absence of this causal relationship. In Robinson,
the Court held that California violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by
imposing criminal liability solely on the ground of the petitioner’s status as a drug
addict. 370 U.S. at 666–67. The Court reasoned that “in the light of contemporary
human knowledge, a law which made a criminal offense of such a disease [as drug
addiction] would doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment.” Id. at 666. In Powell, however, the Court upheld the
conviction of the petitioner for public intoxication. 392 U.S. at 516 (plurality
opinion). The plurality in Powell distinguished Robinson by noting that Powell was
not criminally liable for being an alcoholic, but “for public behavior which may
create substantial health and safety hazards.” Id. at 532. Powell thus recognizes the
important difference between an individual’s status of being a drug addict, which is
almost always the product of a past choice on her part but is now an immutable
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2.

Socially-beneficial activities
Society also has an enhanced duty to protect those vulnerabilities
that arise from socially-beneficial activities. For instance, few would
argue that a soldier’s voluntary decision to assume the risks of service
means that society has no duty to protect her from those risks.
Rather, her socially-beneficial activity gives rise to an enhanced duty
101
of protection, both to prevent harm and to compensate when harm
102
Similarly, society protects police officers and firefighters
occurs.
from the risks that arise as a result of their service. Thus, police are
103
provided bullet-proof vests and other safety equipment,
and
constitutionally-recognized interests of suspects give way to concerns
104
for the safety of officers.
Socially-beneficial activities entitled to societal protection extend
beyond
prototypical
and
politically-popular
public-service
employment. Take unpopular speech, for example. It benefits
society by, inter alia, inviting discussion, stirring the dissatisfied into
105
action, and inspiring change. The importance of protecting those
who engage in unpopular speech is borne out by the First
Amendment’s prohibition on the prosecution of those who engage in
such speech and the imposition on police of the obligation to
characteristic, and her intoxication on a given occasion, which is the more direct
result of a choice by the defendant. This is not to say that this distinction is beyond
reproach. See Michael C. Dorf, Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law’s
Social Meanings, 97 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1311–14 (2011) (criticizing the normative value
of distinguishing status and conduct); Douglas N. Husak, Addiction and Criminal
Liability, 18 L. & PHIL. 655, 658–59 (1999) (arguing that the pain of withdrawal could
satisfy the threat of harm element of a duress defense to a charge of illegal drug use).
Nevertheless, Powell and Robinson can be read to reflect the understanding that as the
causal relationship between an individual’s past choice and the resulting
vulnerability becomes more attenuated, society’s obligation to protect against that
vulnerability becomes more prominent.
101. See, e.g., Editorial, A Failure to Protect Our Troops, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2007, at
A30 (criticizing the Pentagon’s decision to ignore requests from field commanders
in Iraq for better armor-protected vehicles).
102. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 145 (1950) (noting that the
compensation system for soldiers “compare[s] extremely favorably” with workers’
compensation statutes in finding that additional recovery is not permitted under the
Federal Tort Claims Act); Paul R. Gugliuzza, Veterans Benefits in 2010: A New Dialogue
Between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1201, 1255–56
(2011) (noting broad increases in eligibility for and funding of veterans benefits in
2010).
103. See, e.g., James Guelff and Chris McCurley Body Armor Act of 2002, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3796ll-3 (2006) (providing for the donation of used body armor by federal law
enforcement to state law enforcement agencies in light of the substantial risk to law
enforcement officers who do not have body armor).
104. See Kathryn R. Urbonya, Dangerous Misperceptions: Protecting Police Officers,
Society, and the Fourth Amendment Right to Personal Security, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
623, 635 (1995) (discussing the officer safety rationale for a Terry frisk).
105. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408–09 (1989) (discussing some functions
of free speech, including inducing unrest, creating dissatisfaction, or inciting anger).
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106

Unpopular religious practices
prevent violence that might result.
107
are entitled to enhanced legal protection on similar grounds.
Society’s duty to protect also extends to socially-beneficial activities
108
As a corollary to this
not enumerated in the Constitution.
proposition, the existence of society’s duty generally does not depend
upon the motivation behind the vulnerable individual’s engagement
in socially-beneficial activity. Thus, when the government attempts to
encourage enlistment in the military through substantial monetary
109
bonuses, there is no concomitant reduction in protection.
III. THE VULNERABILITIES OF ACTIVE CRIMINAL INFORMANTS
Throughout the process of cooperating with the State, from her
recruitment to the eventual completion of her cooperation
obligations, the active criminal informant primarily has three
vulnerable interests: an interest in avoiding punishment, an interest
110
in avoiding harm, and an interest in autonomy. These interests are
vulnerable to harm because of both inherent characteristics of the
informant system and individual characteristics of informants that
make some informants more vulnerable than others. The following
discussion will outline the systemic vulnerabilities and individual
vulnerabilities in turn and consider in each case the extent of
society’s obligation to protect against the vulnerability.

106. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 1011–12 (2011)
(discussing the “heckler’s veto” in Supreme Court precedent).
107. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, God of Our Fathers, Gods for Ourselves:
Fundamentalism and Postmodern Belief, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 901, 910 (2010)
(noting the Supreme Court’s careful interpretation of federal statutes to protect
small or unpopular minority religions).
108. For instance, in light of the substantial health benefits of breastfeeding,
nearly every state now protects a woman’s right to breastfeed in public. Heather M.
Kolinsky, Respecting Working Mothers with Infant Children: The Need for Increased Federal
Intervention to Develop, Protect, and Support a Breastfeeding Culture in the United States, 17
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 333, 333–34 (2010).
109. See Simon Romero, Iraq or No, Guard Bonus Lures Some to Re-enlist, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 19, 2005, at A10 (noting that National Guard re-enlistment rates rose after
$15,000 bonuses became available to those who re-listed for six years).
110. The informant system has been subject to criticism on a number of other
grounds, including its negative impact on the purposes of law enforcement, the
potential it creates for corruption, its deleterious effect on crime victims, and its
tendency to result in inaccurate outcomes. See NATAPOFF, supra note 13, at 31–39,
69–81 (discussing the varied social and legal costs of reliance on informants). At
some level, criminal informants share these interests with society at-large. Indeed,
criminal informants on average would likely benefit more than the rest of society
from improving the accuracy of criminal justice outcomes because they come into
personal contact with the criminal justice system more frequently than most.
Nonetheless, such diffuse interests do not approach in importance the individual
potential informant’s immediate concerns about avoiding punishment, remaining
unharmed, and being able to make knowing and voluntary choices.
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A. Systemic Vulnerabilities
1.

The vulnerable interest in avoiding punishment
Criminal informants have an interest in avoiding punishment for
their crimes, and this interest is vulnerable to government
111
interference when informants cooperate.
But the informant’s
interest in avoiding punishment is harmful to society and thus not
112
First, allowing an informant to avoid
entitled to protection.
punishment undermines the retributive goals of the criminal system
113
because she is not punished in accordance with her moral desert.
Moreover, the release of known criminal informants back into society
without punishment interferes with the expressive function of
criminal law by suggesting that criminal culpability is fungible and
that the criminal justice system is more important than criminal
114
justice itself.
Finally, to the extent that punishment itself may
provide some benefit to the informant, avoiding that punishment is
115
ultimately harmful to her. For these reasons, the discussion of the
informant’s interests will ignore the informant’s interest in avoiding
criminal punishment.
2.

The vulnerable interest in being free from harm
Most concretely, informants risk bodily harm or death should their
116
An informant’s cooperation can be
cooperation be discovered.
discovered through bad luck or through malfeasance or misfeasance

111. See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE
L.J. 1909, 1928 (1992) (arguing that abolishing plea bargaining on paternalism
grounds would harm many defendants by exposing them to longer prison
sentences).
112. The notion that an individual’s interest in engaging in socially-harmful
activity is not entitled to society’s protection is a corollary to the principle discussed
above that vulnerabilities arising from socially-beneficial activities are entitled to
greater protection. See supra notes 101–09 and accompanying text.
113. See Rich, supra note 21, at 741 (asserting that reducing leniency for criminal
informants will deter crime and increase community faith in police). But see Simons,
supra note 13, at 54 (arguing that cooperation itself may be a form of punishment
that counsels in favor of lighter formal punishments for some informants).
114. Natapoff, supra note 16, at 680–82.
115. See, e.g., Herbert Morris, A Paternalistic Theory of Punishment, 18 AM. PHIL. Q.
263, 264 (1981) (emphasizing the good of the wrongdoer as a justification for
punishment within the paternalistic theory).
116. See HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 33, at 68 (considering the social and physical
vulnerability of an informant if his identity becomes known to his peers); GARY T.
MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 146 (1988) (attributing
increased homicide rates in the 1970s, in part, to retaliatory violence against
suspected informants).
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117

by law enforcement. While there are no data on the frequency of
violence against informants, reported cases involving violent crimes
118
against informants are legion.
And the informant is vulnerable to
harm not only at the hands of those against whom she is cooperating;
rather, the criminal population at-large may punish a “snitch,” and
the risk is especially acute if the informant’s cooperation is revealed
119
while she is incarcerated.
The potential harm facing criminal informants is not limited to
physical injury. They also risk moral harm to the extent that they are
required to commit additional and more severe criminal offenses to
120
receive leniency. Committing these criminal acts, even though they
may not be strictly illegal due to State authorization, acclimatizes the
informant to a level of criminality with which she may not yet be
familiar. For instance, an informant who is believed to be involved in
small-time marijuana dealing may be pressured to set up deals
involving more serious drugs, like cocaine or heroin, or other
121
contraband, such as firearms.
Beyond the risk that the informant
will be at risk of physical violence as a result of being out of her depth
122
in this more serious criminality, this exposure may also break down
internal barriers to participating in more serious offenses, resulting
123
in a sort of “moral corrosion” of the informant. Similarly, because
the informant will likely recognize cooperation as itself an immoral
act of betrayal, it will leave her demoralized and ill-at-ease with the

117. See ACLU STUDY, supra note 1, at 9–10 (discussing reports that police
inadvertently or intentionally “burn[ed]” informants, exposing them as
cooperators).
118. See Caren Myers Morrison, Privacy, Accountability, and the Cooperating Defendant:
Towards a New Role for Internet Access to Court Records, 62 VAND. L. REV. 921, 958 n.213
(2009) (collecting cases in which informants were harmed or killed).
119. See Benefield v. McDowall, 241 F.3d 1267, 1272 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that
labeling a prison inmate a “snitch” creates a “substantial risk of serious harm” to the
inmate and collecting cases to that effect from other courts); Simons, supra note 13,
at 29–30 (“In prison, the cooperator will be exposed to the continual threat of
physical retaliation, even from prisoners completely unconnected with the
cooperator.”).
120. This risk is analogous to the type faced by undercover police officers who
engage in authorized illegality to maintain their cover and gain the trust of the
targets of their investigation. See Elizabeth E. Joh, Breaking the Law to Enforce It:
Undercover Police Participation in Crime, 62 STAN. L. REV. 155, 190 (2009) (discussing the
psychological harms and temptations suffered by undercover agents who participate
in authorized crimes).
121. See Rich, supra note 21, at 681–84 (discussing the case of Rachel Morningstar
Hoffman).
122. See id. at 683–84 (asserting that Hoffman risked injury and death in order to
cooperate with the police).
123. See Joh, supra note 120, at 190 (discussing the “moral corrosion” of
undercover agents who participate in crimes).
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124

actions that she undertakes.
Finally, criminal informants also risk harm to their relationships
125
with others, a harm that will be referred to as “social harm.”
Specifically, if her cooperation is discovered, the criminal informant
is likely to be ostracized by both her criminal and law-abiding
communities. She may find it difficult to continue making a living
through illicit means, as other criminals will be unwilling to trust a
126
known “rat.” Moreover, she may be deprived of legitimate business
opportunities, as well as interaction with others in her religious or
127
Such isolation, combined with the constant
ethnic communities.
threat of physical harm, can take a substantial psychological toll on
128
the informant.
The concept of “social harm” as used herein
therefore includes both economic and psychological harm to the
informant.
The informant’s vulnerabilities to harm arise from her involvement
129
in the socially-beneficial activity of assisting the police. As a result,
124. Simons, supra note 13, at 31.
125. This use of the term “social harm” is entirely distinct from the concept of
“social harm” that underpins criminal law. See, e.g., Eugene R. Milhizer, Justification
and Excuse: What They Were, What They Are, and What They Ought To Be, 78 ST. JOHN’S
L. REV. 725, 805 (2004) (discussing the traditional use of the concept of “social
harm” in criminal law, where a “harm is referred to as ‘social harm’ because the
prohibited conduct is a public wrong that offends the common good”).
126. See Simons, supra note 13, at 29–31 (observing the costs of ostracism of
cooperators from criminal and legitimate social groups).
127. Id. at 30; see Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 69, 79–80
(1995) (noting the “social cost” of becoming an informant).
128. See Estate of Rhoad v. East Vincent Twp, No. 05-5875, 2006 WL 1071573, at
*1–2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 18, 2006) (deciding a § 1983 claim involving an informant who
committed suicide after police refused to allow him to cease cooperation and enter
drug rehabilitation); Williamson v. City of Virginia Beach, 786 F. Supp. 1238, 1241,
1245–46 (E.D. Va. 1992) (adjudicating a § 1983 claim that a seventeen-year-old
informant committed suicide as a result of threats received after he agreed to
cooperate), aff’d per curiam, 991 F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1993); David Hasemyer & Mark T.
Sullivan, Courtroom Suicide Exposes DEA Dark Side: Informant’s Death Reveals Seamy
Underworld of the Drug War, SAN DIEGO TRIB., Jan. 27, 1992, at A1 (discussing the case
of an informant who committed suicide in courtroom after being sentenced to
twenty-five years in prison).
129. The description of assisting the police as a socially-beneficial activity does not
reflect an empirical assessment of whether the assistance that any one informant
provides to the police in fact provides a net benefit to society. Cf. Miriam Hechler
Baer, Cooperation’s Cost, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 903, 905–10 (2011) (suggesting that
cooperation may cause a net harm to society and recommending studies of
informant use to determine the extent of such harm). Rather, it acknowledges two
less debatable propositions. First, assisting the police is behavior that society wishes
to encourage because enforcement of the criminal laws is necessary to social stability
and cannot be accomplished efficiently without civilian cooperation. Cf. Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477–78 (1966) (“It is an act of responsible citizenship for
individuals to give whatever information they may have to aid in law enforcement.”).
Second, though assistance may not benefit society in all cases, it would be unjust for
society to externalize that risk at the expense of the criminal informant, who is less
capable than the relevant agents of the State to determine whether cooperation in a
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society owes the informant a greater duty to protect her against the
130
resulting risks of harm. But the contention may be made that the
promise of leniency offered to an informant is compensation enough
131
for those risks and that additional protections are not required. In
this vein, Judge Posner, explaining why inducing an informant to
engage in sexual intercourse with the target of an investigation is not
necessarily a constitutional violation, argued in dicta that:
[C]onfidential informants often agree to engage in risky
undercover work in exchange for leniency, and we cannot think of
any reason, especially any reason rooted in constitutional text or
doctrine, for creating a categorical prohibition against the
informant’s incurring a cost that takes a different form from the
usual risk of being beaten up or for that matter bumped off by a
drug dealer with whom one is negotiating a purchase or sale of
drugs in the hope of obtaining lenient treatment from the
132
government.

There are two responses to this argument. First, informant
recruitment is so inherently coercive that the decisions of some
133
Even on the
criminal informants to cooperate are not voluntary.
terms of Judge Posner’s argument, an informant who does not agree
voluntarily to exchange her cooperation for the promise of leniency
134
is still entitled to protection.
Second, Judge Posner’s argument delineates only the State’s legal
135
obligations to criminal informants, not society’s normative duties.
given case will be beneficial. For these reasons, cooperation is properly viewed as
socially beneficial activity that gives rise to a duty to protect the cooperator.
130. See Garcia v. United States, 666 F.2d 960, 962–63 (5th Cir. 1982) (observing
that the federal Witness Protection Program was created “in response to a felt moral
obligation to repay citizens who risk life by carrying out their duty as citizens to
testify”); cf. Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 559 & n.2 (1961) (recognizing
that an accomplice to a crime has a duty, like every other citizen, to testify despite
threats of physical reprisals, even though the State also has an obligation to protect
citizens from harm).
131. See, e.g., Vélez-Díaz v. Vega-Irizarry, 421 F.3d 71, 81 (1st Cir. 2005) (rejecting a
Bivens claim by family members of a murdered criminal informant because “[t]here
are risks inherent in being a cooperating witness . . . and the witness voluntarily
assumes those risks”); Summar v. Bennett, 157 F.3d 1054, 1058–59 (6th Cir. 1998)
(dismissing a constitutional claim arising from the murder of a criminal informant
who “voluntarily agreed to serve as a confidential informant, albeit ‘motivated by . . .
promises regarding the decedent’s pending drug charge’”).
132. Alexander v. DeAngelo, 329 F.3d 912, 918 (7th Cir. 2003).
133. See supra Part I.B (detailing the coercive influences police exert over potential
informants, including capitalizing on fear of punishment and emphasizing the
maximize penalties).
134. See Alexander, 329 F.3d at 918 (recognizing that police tactics rising to the
level of coercion are actionable under § 1983 based on the premise that the
informant’s consent is deemed involuntary).
135. Posner is of course correct as a legal matter: the Supreme Court in DeShaney
v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services held that because the Due Process

RICH.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

1458

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

6/14/2012 7:14 PM

[Vol. 61:1433

As discussed previously, choice is not the only touchstone in
ascertaining whether society has a duty to protect a vulnerable
136
Rather, society also has a normative duty to protect
individual.
those who engage in socially-beneficial activities, such as assisting law
enforcement. This duty governs despite the admittedly selfish
137
motivations that drive most informants.
Moreover, failing to
protect informants runs contrary to due process norms by stripping
criminal informants of society’s protections and essentially punishing
them for their criminal activity without requiring a conviction and
138
providing them the benefit of due process.
3.

The vulnerable interest in autonomy
Like everyone else, criminal informants have an interest in
preserving their autonomy, i.e., in being permitted to make decisions
139
about their own lives free from government intervention.
With
respect to cooperation, this means that informants have an interest in
being permitted to weigh the risks and benefits of assisting the police,
to decide whether cooperation is in their best interest, and to have
that decision be given full effect.
The impact of the informant recruitment system on the autonomy
of potential informants has been the subject of only limited scholarly
140
discussion.
Scholarship on the impact of plea bargaining on a
141
criminal defendant’s autonomy is far more voluminous, however.
Clause only limits the State’s power to act, it does not require the government to
protect citizens from injury at the hands of third parties absent some State action
depriving the individual of the power to protect herself. 489 U.S. 189, 195–96
(1989).
136. Supra notes 101–09 and accompanying text.
137. See Simons, supra note 13, at 2 (“[C]ooperators want what only prosecutors
can offer: leniency, or at least a recommendation for leniency.”).
138. Though this does not give rise to a constitutional claim, it runs contrary to
the due process principle that one should not be subject to punishment prior to
conviction for a crime. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (considering
whether the conditions of the defendant’s pretrial detention constituted punishment
under the Fourteenth Amendment).
139. See Erica J. Hashimoto, Resurrecting Autonomy: The Criminal Defendant’s Right to
Control the Case, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1147, 1153 (2010) (discussing the autonomy interest
associated with a criminal defendant’s conditional rights). Though autonomy can be
a “protean concept,” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV.
875, 876 (1994), the application of the ideal of autonomy herein is sufficiently
straightforward that complexities about its precise definition can be set aside.
140. See NATAPOFF, supra note 13, at 40–41 (discussing the imbalance of power and
disparity of information between law enforcement and potential new informants).
141. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1980
(1992) (arguing for the abolition of plea bargaining and questioning “[t]he
presumptive fairness of settlement”); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 111, at 1910
(analyzing plea bargaining under a contract theory); see also Frank H. Easterbrook,
Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 289 (1983) (analyzing
plea bargaining as an element of a market system, part of what “set[s] the ‘price’ of
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Given the structural similarity between plea bargains and cooperation
142
plea bargaining literature provides an instructive
agreements,
starting point for analyzing the impact of cooperation agreements on
informant autonomy.
From the standpoint of enhancing autonomy, permitting
cooperation, like allowing plea bargaining, gives the negotiating
143
civilian more choices than she would have available otherwise. That
said, the institution of plea bargaining is frequently criticized for
encumbering defendants with many bargaining disadvantages,
including the critique that the “freedom” to plea bargain is neither
144
free nor voluntary.
Some of these criticisms are particularly
relevant to cooperation agreements. Critics argue, inter alia, that
threats of criminal sanction are so coercive as to render any plea
bargain involuntary; that plea agreements are unconscionable
because of the vastly superior bargaining position occupied by the
State; and that plea bargains are essentially fraudulent because
defendants lack information material to their ability to make an
145
informed agreement.
These arguments will be discussed in turn
below, with a particular emphasis on what the differences between
plea bargains and cooperation agreements suggest about a potential
informant’s entitlement to protection of her autonomy interests.
a.

The coercive threat of criminal sanctions

Whenever a civilian negotiates with the State with the possibility of
criminal sanctions on the line, the civilian is faced with the “difficult
choice” of deciding what she is willing to give up to avoid that
146
In the case of a pleading defendant, the State demands
sanction.
that she give up her constitutional right to trial in exchange for some

crime”).
142. Specifically, in the context of both plea bargaining and cooperation
agreements, an individual suspected of criminal activity contemplates whether to
exchange something of great value, be it her right to trial or her active assistance, for
leniency in an actual or potential criminal prosecution. See Natapoff, supra note 16,
at 664–65 (describing cooperation agreements as “an extreme form of plea
bargain”).
143. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 111, at 1913–17 (discussing the autonomy
benefits of plea bargains); see also Easterbrook, supra note 141, at 317 (same).
Without the option of becoming an informant, the choices of a majority of potential
criminal informants would be limited to those available to any individual suspected
of a crime.
144. John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea
Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 490 n.231 (2001).
145. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 111, at 1919–24 (collecting and responding to
arguments that plea bargaining is coercive or unconscionable).
146. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
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The
measure of certainty about the punishment she will receive.
potential criminal informant is offered a similar bargain: she can
work for the police in exchange for a more lenient punishment —or
148
possibly no punishment at all—for her crimes.
149
But difficult choices are not necessarily involuntary ones.
Thus,
in the plea bargaining context, the question boils down to whether
the threat of criminal sanctions is so severe or the offer of leniency so
150
compelling that the defendant agrees to the bargain involuntarily.
Critics of plea bargaining claim that criminal sanctions are so
inherently unpleasant, and the opportunity to avoid them so
desirable, that an offer of leniency overcomes the will of the
151
negotiating defendant in all cases.
A similar argument could be made, of course, in the context of
potential informants who negotiate with law enforcement officers
who are threatening them with criminal sanctions if they fail to
cooperate. Such an argument gives rise to the same question: are
threats of criminal sanctions so inherently coercive that they render
one incapable of entering into a voluntary agreement? The Supreme
147. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 111, at 1914.
148. See Rich, supra note 21, at 713–16 (arguing that demanding cooperation
under the threat of more severe criminal punishment violates the Thirteenth
Amendment’s prohibition on involuntary servitude).
149. In Aristotle’s famous example, a ship’s captain caught in a storm who
jettisons cargo in order to save his crew has acted voluntarily in the sense that he
freely made a choice between two undesirable results. See Joseph M. Perillo, The
Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L.
REV. 427, 469 (2000) (using Aristotle’s example to illustrate that, even in cases of
duress, the element of choice exists); see also Scott & Stuntz, supra note 111, at 1920
(“[C]oercion in the sense of few and unpalatable choices does not necessarily negate
voluntary choice.”).
150. See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363 (noting the validity of plea bargaining so
long as the defendant is free to accept or decline for her own reasons). It should be
noted that critics of plea bargaining and the informant system both raise numerous
other concerns with these two aspects of the criminal justice system. See, e.g.,
NATAPOFF, supra note 13, at 31–38 (discussing numerous critiques of the informant
system); Schulhofer, supra note 141, at 1979 (arguing that plea bargaining “impairs
the public interest in effective punishment of crime and in accurate separation of the
guilty from the innocent”). These arguments are outside the scope of this Article,
however, which focuses on interests typically ignored in the literature: those unique
to the potential criminal informant.
151. Critics of plea bargaining go as far as to analogize plea bargain negotiations
to negotiating at gunpoint or under threat of torture. See Albert W. Alschuler,
Straining at Gnats and Swallowing Camels: The Selective Morality of Professor Bibas, 88
CORNELL L. REV. 1412, 1417 (2003) (arguing that guilty pleas, following protestations
of innocence and induced by threats of additional punishment, cannot be relied
upon); Kenneth Kipnis, Criminal Justice and the Negotiated Plea, 86 ETHICS 93, 97–99
(1976) (noting that, whether threatened with a gun during a robbery or with the
death penalty during a trial, a reasonable victim may have no choice but to give in to
the coercion); John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 3
(1978) (arguing parallels in the origin, function, and doctrine of the laws of modern
plea bargaining and medieval torture).
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Court and supporters of plea-bargaining have argued that they
are not. However, the claim that the potential informant should be
entitled to per se protection from this possible coercion fails for
another reason: the informant’s vulnerability to the coercive threat
of criminal sanctions is the result of her choice to engage in criminal
154
activity. Put simply, every individual knows that, should she commit
a crime and authorities discover it, she will face difficult choices that
155
hinge on the threat of criminal sanctions.
Moreover, citizens are
generally aware of criminal sanctions and expect them to be
156
Thus, a potential
sufficiently unpleasant to deter crime.
152. See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364 (“While confronting a defendant with the
risk of more severe punishment clearly may have a ‘discouraging effect on the
defendant’s assertion of his trial rights, the imposition of these difficult choices [is]
an inevitable’— and permissible—‘attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates
and encourages the negotiation of pleas.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Chaffin
v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 31 (1973))); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755
(1970) (rejecting the argument that a plea bargain is per se involuntary if
prosecution seeks the death penalty); see also United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S.
196, 209–10 (1995) (holding that requiring a waiver of otherwise excluded
statements made during negotiation as a condition of entering into plea discussion
was not unconstitutionally coercive, as the dilemma facing the defendant “is
indistinguishable from any of a number of difficult choices that criminal defendants
face every day”).
153. Scott and Stuntz argue that under a contract theory of duress, a contract is
voidable by one party only if the other wrongfully compelled her to enter into the
contract. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 111, at 1919. Consequently, the dispositive
question in the plea-bargaining context is whether the prosecutor is responsible for
the coercive nature of the plea bargain. Id. at 1920–21. In a typical case, absent
strategic manipulation of post-trial sentences by the prosecutor, sentencing policy is
to blame for the coercion, so there is no duress as a matter of contract law. Id.
154. Of course, this may not always be the case. Another significant objection to
plea-bargaining is that prosecutors can coerce risk-averse innocent defendants into
pleading guilty to avoid the chance that they might be found guilty and subjected to
a lengthy prison sentence. Ric Simmons, Private Plea Bargains, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1125,
1171–72 (2011). Similarly, when the State erroneously threatens an innocent
individual with prosecution, she might decide to become an active informant to
avoid the risk of allowing the threatened prosecution to move forward. Although
there is no hard data on how frequently police threaten innocent people with
criminal charges to coerce cooperation, anecdotal reports suggest that it does occur.
See ACLU STUDY, supra note 1, at 52–53. While such cases fall outside the scope of
this Article, potential informants who are innocent of threatened charges would
particularly benefit from the information-enhancing proposals set forth infra Part
VI.C.
155. Indeed, the possibility of avoiding punishment through cooperation is an
ingrained fact in criminal culture. See NATAPOFF, supra note 13, at 43–44 (lamenting
the trend toward criminals mitigating punishment for serious crimes by seeking
cooperation with prosecutors); Richard Rosenfeld et al., Snitching and the Code of the
Street, 43 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 291, 298–300 (2003) (observing that informers
weigh —and perhaps underestimate—risks to avoid detention, yet experience has
taught several that routine police pressure tactics often overstate the threat of jail
time).
156. See Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal
Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1390
(2003) (invoking Jeremy Bentham and Immanuel Kant, who viewed punishment’s
pain as a way to offset its benefits while also communicating to society both
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informant’s vulnerability to such threats can be said to arise from her
157
knowing, voluntary choice to engage in criminal activity, and society
should not forbid cooperation on the ground that potential criminal
informants deserve protection from the unpleasant choice between
158
jail and cooperation.
b.

The State’s superior bargaining position

Critics of plea-bargaining also contend that the inherent
differential in bargaining power between the prosecutor and the
159
defendant is so vast that plea bargains are unconscionable.
According to these critics, prosecutors face little risk of acquittal at
trial, while defendants face a steeply increased punishment in the
condemnation and the unpleasant consequences of criminality).
157. Interestingly, the Supreme Court’s decisions in the plea-bargaining context
hinge on the assumption that only guilty defendants plead guilty. See Corinna
Barrett Lain, Accuracy Where It Matters: Brady v. Maryland in the Plea Bargaining
Context, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 19–20 & n.89 (2002) (collecting various Supreme Court
cases that presume the accuracy of guilty pleas and thus declining to upset their
finality). As a result, they suggest that part of the reason why society will not protect
criminal defendants from the potential coercion in the plea-bargaining context is
that the defendant’s vulnerability arises from her choice to engage in criminal
conduct.
158. Of course, just because society should not forbid all cooperation agreements
on the ground that the threat of criminal sanction is coercive does not mean that all
such agreements are valid. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 210 (1995)
(“[A]lthough some waiver agreements ‘may not be the product of an informed and
voluntary decision,’ this possibility ‘does not justify invalidating all such
agreements.’” (quoting Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 393 (1987))). The
Due Process Clause forbids involuntary confessions and plea agreements, and the
Supreme Court’s plea-bargaining jurisprudence instructs lower courts to engage in a
case-by-case review to ensure that no due process violations have occurred. See id.
(suggesting that courts should engage in a case-by-case review of waiver agreements
to ensure a lack of coercion or fraud); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750–55
(1970) (refusing to forbid plea agreements entirely and instead asking whether, on
the facts of the case, the defendant entered into the agreement involuntarily);
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376 (1964) (“It is now axiomatic that a defendant in
a criminal case is deprived of due process of law if his conviction is founded, in whole
or in part, upon an involuntary confession, without regard for the truth or falsity of
the confession . . . .”). Such a case-by-case analysis in the informant context would
permit potential informants protection from vulnerabilities, including those
discussed infra Part VI.C, that are not the result of their own choice. Cf. Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972) (“[O]ne might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in
general, and the Due Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect
the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for
efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials . . .
.”).
159. See Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 45–51 (dividing prosecutors’
dominance into four elements: (1) low risk to the prosecutor of acquittal if the case
goes to trial; (2) high risk to a defendant of a “trial penalty”; (3) ability to charge a
defendant with crimes more serious than warranted; and (4) alignment of defense
attorneys’ personal interests in acquiescing; resulting in “a process which is not an
adversarial negotiation”).
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likely event that they are found guilty. As a result, prosecutors have
the power to determine the defendant’s sentence unilaterally and
161
impose it in the form of a non-negotiable offer.
Plea-bargaining’s
supporters contend that the prosecutor’s bargaining power
162
advantage is not as great as feared.
This is because, unlike an
individual customer of a mass-market good who has little to offer the
seller, each defendant has the right to force a costly and time163
consuming trial.
According to these scholars, the power to allow
the prosecutor to forego such a trial is sufficient to prevent the plea
164
bargain from being unconscionable.
Cooperation is similar to plea-bargaining because the State’s offer
of leniency is of great value to the potential informant. But the
bargaining position of potential informants varies more than the
plea-bargaining defendant’s and often is much weaker. In particular,
while a plea-bargaining defendant always has something valuable to
offer the prosecutor, the information and access that most potential
165
informants can provide is essentially fungible.
For instance, lowlevel drug offenders generally can do little more than use their
criminal connections to arrange for controlled drug buys that allow
166
police to arrest other minor criminals. Though these connections
have some value, legions of individuals commit minor drug offenses
167
and have such connections. Moreover, an offender who refuses to
cooperate places only a slight burden on the arresting officer who
tried to obtain her cooperation. At most, the officer must bear the
cost of passing any evidence of the offender’s wrongdoing on to a

160. Id. at 45–46.
161. Id.
162. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 111, at 1923–24 & n.55.
163. Id. at 1924.
164. Id.
165. A handful of informants do possess substantial bargaining power in that few
others share their access to evidence. For instance, an informant with established
contacts to a suspected criminal organization—be it a terrorist group, a street gang,
or a corrupt business —is in a strong position to negotiate with the police. These
informants can save law enforcement untold hours of work and mitigate many of the
potential risks to agents and thus can exact a heavy price for their information. The
relative utility of such high-value informants and their scarcity can be seen in the
extensive protections provided by the federal Witness Security Program to a small
number of federal informants. See infra notes 251–56 and accompanying text
(detailing extensive measures authorized to protect potential witnesses to serious
crimes).
166. See ACLU STUDY, supra note 1, at 51 (finding that drug-addicted informants
typically arranged stings that caught dealers in possession of ten to twenty bags or
vials of drugs).
167. See SKOLNICK, supra note 23, at 121–22 (noting that while “the police need
informers,” the target of an informant’s sting often “cannot bring themselves to
believe how little they have been sold out for”).
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168

Thus, most potential informants
prosecutor and testifying at trial.
resemble the consumer of a mass-marketed good: she can impose
only a minimal cost on the government agent by refusing to
cooperate while the agent can impose a substantial cost on her
169
should she refuse.
This puts the potential informant in a “take-it170
or-leave-it” situation typical of a contract of adhesion.
Yet here again, the potential informant’s vulnerability to the State’s
unequal bargaining power results from the informant’s voluntary and
171
knowing decision to engage in criminal conduct.
By engaging in
criminal activity, an individual knowingly submits herself to the
State’s monopoly over criminal punishment, and it is no secret that
the decision of whether to grant her leniency in exchange for
cooperation is at the discretion of law enforcement agents. Similarly,
courts will refuse to find adhesion contracts unconscionable where
the weaker party failed to avail herself of alternatives prior to
172
negotiating, including the option to walk away.
As such, the
168. In most drug cases the burden on officers will not include testifying in court,
as more than ninety percent of those convicted of drug offenses are convicted
through a guilty plea, and very few charges are resolved through acquittal. Beth A.
Freeborn, Arrest Avoidance: Law Enforcement and the Price of Cocaine, 52 J.L. & ECON. 19,
29–30 (2009).
169. See William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow,
117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2565 (2004) (“In a system (like ours) that rewards snitches
generously, some defendants will be punished very harshly—nominally for their
crimes, but actually for not having the kind of information one gets only by working
at high levels of criminal organizations.”).
170. See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV.
139, 202 (2005) (“Similarly, adhesion contract doctrine explicitly incorporates
inequality of bargaining power by defining adhesion contracts as those presented on
a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ basis by a party with stronger bargaining power to a party with
weaker bargaining power.”). See generally Amy J. Schmitz, Pizza-Box Contracts: True
Tales of Consumer Contracting Culture, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 863, 866–73 (2010)
(discussing approaches taken by courts and scholars to so-called “pizza-box”
contracts in the consumer realm: classical and formalistic, as well as relational and
behavioral).
171. Again, this analysis is based on the assumption that the potential informant is
a potential criminal informant, i.e., an individual who in fact has engaged in criminal
activity. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (explaining that avoiding the risk
of worse outcomes can incentivize innocent defendants to plead guilty); supra note
157 (contemplating the Supreme Court’s reliance on the assumption of truth).
172. See Barnhizer, supra note 170, at 204–05 (underscoring the fact that
negotiating parties always have the option to refuse agreement, so adhesive terms are
not inherently coercive). Moreover, equalizing the bargaining power would permit
potential informants to maximize their interest in avoiding criminal punishment.
This interest is not one that the State should protect. See supra notes 111–15 and
accompanying text (explaining that asymmetrical bargaining creates a disincentive
for harmful activity and that the resulting vulnerabilities do not arise from sociallybeneficial activities entitled greater protection). In contrast, enabling the consumer
to negotiate on a relatively equal footing in an open market vindicates broader
societal interests. See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1411–
16 (2004) (arguing that underestimating costs at the time of agreement translates
into ultimately bearing that burden when conditions make it relatively costlier,
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potential informant, unlike the consumer facing an unconscionable
adhesion contract, is not entitled to protection from her weakness in
173
bargaining position vis-à-vis the State.
c.

Information asymmetry

Critics also argue that plea bargains are unconscionable because
the prosecutor has superior knowledge of the strength of the case
against the defendant as well as the “‘market value’ for such a
174
case.” The supporter’s response is that the terms of a plea bargain
are usually straightforward, and thus even the most substandard
defense counsel can assist a defendant in effectively negotiating a
175
plea.
Unlike the plea-bargaining defendant, however, the potential
176
informant has no right to counsel.
As a result, she does not have
access to a lawyer’s expertise in evaluating government offers in light
177
of the facts and “customary practices.”
The potential informant
faces numerous unknowns, including the charges she might
confront, the chance of being convicted on those charges, the
possible sentence she might receive, and the going market value of
178
any cooperation she could provide. Police and prosecutors, on the
other hand, know the evidence they have against the potential
distorting incentive structures critical to the freedom of contract).
173. The conclusion that potential informants are not entitled to per se
protection from coercion by the strong arm of the State may seem unjust at first
blush. Importantly, however, the absence of per se safeguards does not preclude
measures more narrowly-tailored to protect individual informants who are
particularly susceptible to coercion for reasons that are not the direct result of their
choices. See infra Part VI.B (detailing the specialized protections in place for certain
classes of at-risk informants).
174. See Kevin O’Keefe, Comment, Two Wrongs Make a Wrong: A Challenge to Plea
Bargaining and Collateral Consequence Statutes Through Their Integration, 100 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 243, 260 (2010); see also Andrew E. Taslitz, Judging Jena’s D.A.: The
Prosecutor and Racial Esteem, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 430–31 (2009) (asserting
that the limited access the defense has to information during the discovery process
further exacerbates bargaining disparities).
175. See Easterbrook, supra note 141, at 309–10 (asserting that there is little reason
to believe that discrepancies in lawyer access or information translates to less
effective counsel); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 111, at 1922–23 (crediting experience
and custom for narrowing the “bargaining range” to one “both small and familiar to
the parties,” resulting in “a good sense of the [particular case’s] ‘market price’”).
176. See United States v. Moody, 206 F.3d 609, 616 (6th Cir. 2000) (identifying
indictment as the threshold for the Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
177. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 111, at 1923 & n.50 (asserting that criminal
defendants do not necessarily have knowledge of likely trial outcomes or the
sentence usually assigned to a guilty plea at the plea bargain stage of the process).
178. See id. at 1959 (recognizing that a defense lawyer is necessary in the pleabargaining context because only the lawyer has the background experience to
differentiate between a good and a bad deal based on her knowledge of trial
outcomes and sentencing and the market for plea-bargains).
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informant and have the experience to ascertain the charges that she
is likely to face and the sentences that might result from such
179
charges. As a result, cooperation agreements “are often struck on
the basis of incomplete, highly imperfect information and little more
than the [potential informant’s] guess about what a trial might reveal
180
if one were held.”
The potential informant’s vulnerability to this information
asymmetry—unlike coercive threats of criminal sanctions and
inherently unequal bargaining power—does not directly result from a
knowing and voluntary choice. The criminal justice system operates
on an explicit constitutional guarantee that a defendant has a right to
181
notice of the charges against her.
Though the system almost
certainly does not require specific notice of charges prior to
182
cooperation negotiations, the explicit statement of that right also
does not suggest to the potential informant that law enforcement
may seek her cooperation without informing her of the specific
183
charges against her.
Moreover, police tactics that discourage the
potential informant from consulting with counsel or taking time to
consider the wisdom of accepting the government’s offer exacerbate
184
her ignorance.
Because the potential informant’s vulnerability to
this information asymmetry is not the result of a knowing and
179. See Taslitz, supra note 174, at 430–31 (discussing the information asymmetry
between the prosecution and defendant in the plea bargaining context). Of course,
many potential informants are themselves “repeat players” in the criminal justice
system. Nonetheless, the personal experience of even the most hardened criminal
with charging and sentencing decisions pales in the comparison with that of a police
officer or prosecutor.
180. Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Wake-Up Call from the Plea-Bargaining Trenches, 19
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 135, 137 (1994) (referring to attorneys’ guesses for defendants’
odds of conviction).
181. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
182. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967) (“Notice, to comply with due process
requirements, must be given sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings
so that reasonable opportunity to prepare will be afforded, and it must set forth the
alleged misconduct with particularity.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
183. Though the maxim that “ignorance of the law is no excuse” embodies
important norms, see Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law Is an Excuse—But Only for the
Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REV. 127, 127–28 (1997), it applies only in those situations
where it can be said that a rule exists and that at least constructive notice of such a
rule is possible. See Dru Stevenson, Toward a New Theory of Notice and Deterrence, 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 1535, 1587–90 (2005) (observing that, where the law is unknowable
even in principle, the notice requirement has no practical effect, inconsistent with its
“sacred and inviolable” status in other contexts). Here, the exercise of law
enforcement discretion in the negotiation of cooperation agreements is not
definable by rules, and even if it were possible to glean a set of rules from practice,
the potential informant does not have access to an attorney, who would be the only
one with the necessary experience to ascertain those rules.
184. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text (characterizing high-pressure
police tactics reported by the ACLU).
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voluntary choice, society should protect the informant against it.
d.

Unenforceability

Cooperation agreements also threaten a potential informant’s
autonomy interests because they are usually unenforceable. First, the
length or nature of the assistance required of the informant or the
nature of the leniency promised by the government may be so vague
185
as to be unenforceable. Second, the government agent who enters
into a cooperation agreement may lack the authority to bind the
186
government.
Third, the agreement almost always reserves to the
government complete discretion to decide whether the informant’s
187
Thus, an active informant is
cooperation warrants leniency.
vulnerable to the risk that she will agree to work for the police only to
188
be denied, without recourse, any benefit for doing so.
Absent some express notice to the potential informant of the likely
unenforceability of any promise made by the State, the informant’s
185. Cf. Krug v. United States, 168 F.3d 1307, 1308–10 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (rejecting
a claim by an IRS informant for a monetary award on the ground that no contract
arises from an indefinite award offer and informant conduct in response).
186. See, e.g., United States v. Flemmi, 225 F.3d 78, 84–91 (1st Cir. 2000) (rejecting
an informant’s claim to use and derivative use immunity arising from promises made
by FBI agents on the ground that the agents lacked the authority to grant immunity);
Confidential Informant v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 1, 7 (2000) (holding that IRS
and FBI agents did not have the actual authority to promise reward to IRS
informant); see also Alemany, supra note 51, at 260–66 (collecting cases where the
courts denied plaintiff-informants’ sums allegedly promised to them on the basis that
the agents involved had no actual authority to contract on the agencies’ behalf).
187. See Pamela R. Metzger, Beyond the Bright Line: A Contemporary Right-to-Counsel
Doctrine, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1635, 1662 (2003) (adding that a defendant’s only
recourse is to assert constitutional claims for the promised motions); Richman, supra
note 127, at 102 n.114 (collecting cases affirming prosecutors’ exclusive discretion).
188. It is worth noting that there are good reasons for the doctrines that render
cooperation agreements unenforceable. The requirement of definiteness, for
instance, guarantees that the government is held to perform only those promises that
they intended to make. See Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite
Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1649–51 (2003) (summarizing the common law
approach that courts will not infer an intent to be bound if the parties leave material
terms unspecified and also delineating its tension with a modern trend toward
contextually supplying terms). The requirement of actual authority to bind the
government stems from concerns about sovereign immunity and a desire to protect
the public fisc from the actions of unauthorized government agents. See Alan I.
Saltman, The Government’s Liability for Actions of Its Agents That Are Not Specifically
Authorized: The Continuing Influence of Merrill and Richmond, 32 PUB. CONT. L.J. 775,
781 (2003) (stating that conserving public moneys and the separation of powers
informs the doctrine of sovereign immunity).
Additionally, by maintaining
discretion to assess the informant’s compliance with the agreement, the State helps
to guarantee the informant’s enthusiastic and honest cooperation and to maintain its
control over the informant. See Richman, supra note 127, at 95–102 (explaining that
the government needs a mechanism in place to discourage a defendant from
defecting from an agreement). Whether these reasons justify the unwillingness of
courts to enforce cooperation agreements is a separate question, however, and one
outside the scope of the instant inquiry.
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vulnerability to the risk that she will be unable to enforce the State’s
promise is not the result of her informed choice. A potential
informant may believe, entirely reasonably, that when an agent of the
State makes a promise, even one that is in some way indefinite, the
promise will be enforceable. As such, the State has a duty to protect
against this vulnerability.
Moreover, at least in some cases, government agents make
promises to potential informants for the purpose of encouraging
189
cooperation but with the knowledge that they are unenforceable.
In doing so, agents take advantage of the pre-existing information
190
asymmetry between them and informants.
This is particularly
troubling where the agent has dissuaded the potential informant
from seeking the assistance of counsel, who would no doubt inform
191
her of the likely unenforceability of the State’s promise.
The
192
former resembles a case of promissory estoppel; the latter looks like
193
promissory fraud. In either event, the equities favor requiring the
189. No data are available to suggest how frequently police officers make such
promises, but there is ample reason to believe that such cases are not uncommon.
First, it is well-established that law enforcement agents are permitted to lie and
engage in other trickery in their dealings with suspected criminals. See Christopher
Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies by the Police, 76 OR. L. REV. 775,
778–79 (1997) (highlighting the Supreme Court’s deference to law enforcement
agents’ judgment that valuable information would be inaccessible without
deception). Some experts specifically encourage police to lie when attempting to
recruit criminal informants. See MALLORY, supra note 1, at 23 (advocating for
“informed bluff[ing]” as an effective tool in recruiting informants). Moreover, law
enforcement guidelines for the handling of confidential informants often make clear
that agents lack the authority to promise immunity or leniency to informants and
instruct agents not to make such promises. See Flemmi, 225 F.3d at 88–89 (discussing
historical FBI guidelines on the use of informants relating to promises of immunity);
JOHN ASHCROFT, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S GUIDELINES REGARDING THE USE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS 5 (2002)
[hereinafter DOJ GUIDELINES], available at http://www.ignet.gov/pande/standards/
invprg1211apph.pdf (describing cases where informants claim that law enforcement
agents made unauthorized promises of leniency or immunity continue to arise).
190. See Charles A. Sullivan, The Puzzling Persistence of Unenforceable Contract Terms,
70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1127, 1140 (2009) (discussing the benefits to a party of knowingly
including unenforceable terms in a contract).
191. See supra text accompanying note 48 (referring to defense counsel’s ability to
increase bargaining power as one reason police attempt to discourage their
presence).
192. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981) (“A promise which
the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part
of the promisee . . . is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement . . . .”);
David G. Epstein et al., Reliance on Oral Promises: Statute of Frauds and “Promissory
Estoppel,” 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 913, 915 (2010) (setting forth the elements of
promissory estoppel: “(1) a promise, (2) foreseeability of reliance thereon by the
promisor, and (3) substantial reliance by the promisee to his detriment,” and adding
that various authorities have adopted essentially the same approach (quoting English
v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex. 1983))).
193. See Ian Ayres & Gregory Klass, Promissory Fraud Without Breach, 2004 WIS. L.
REV. 507, 508–09 (“If a court finds that a defendant-promisor did not intend at the
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State to protect the potential informant from the risk that she might
194
rely on unenforceable promises made knowingly by its agents.
B. Individual Vulnerabilities
Beyond the systemic characteristics of the informant system that
make all informants vulnerable to coercion and harm, an informant
who is a minor, mentally ill, or mentally handicapped is especially
vulnerable to harm or interference with her autonomy interests.
Social scientists and courts recognize that minors are more
susceptible than adults to coercion from authority figures, such as
195
police and prosecutors, and that they are less capable of accurately
196
assessing the likely consequences of their decisions.
Similarly,
individuals who are mentally ill are more susceptible to authoritarian
197
pressure in situations that may not appear coercive to others. The
time of promising to perform her promise, then the court can subject her to both
compensatory and punitive damages under the doctrine of promissory fraud . . . .”).
194. This is not to say that informants should be able to bring actions for either
promissory estoppel or promissory fraud, as the same reasons justifying the
unenforceability of the agent’s promises, see supra note 188, also would counsel
against allowing such actions. See generally Ayres & Klass, supra note 193, at 526–32
(discussing situations where fraud with respect to unenforceable promises should not
give rise to valid actions for promissory fraud).
195. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 (2011) (reviewing
precedent and concluding that “a reasonable child subjected to police questioning
will sometimes feel pressured to submit when a reasonable adult would feel free to
go”); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967) (holding that in the absence of counsel “the
greatest care must be taken to assure that [a minor’s] admission was voluntary, in the
sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the
product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair”); Richard
A. Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions and Legal Safeguards in the
Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479, 518 (“[C]hildren and juveniles . . . are also
more predisposed to submissive behavior when questioned by police.”); Patrick M.
McMullen, Comment, Questioning the Questions: The Impermissibility of Police Deception
in Interrogations of Juveniles, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 971, 992–99 (2005) (reviewing the
social science and biological research on juvenile decision-making and concluding
that “children are most vulnerable to coercive police deception”).
196. Richard Rogers et al., The Comprehensibility and Content of Juvenile Miranda
Warnings, 14 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 63, 66–67 (2008) (reviewing research on
developmental issues relating to the ability of juveniles to make meaningful decisions
regarding Miranda waiver, including tendencies to overweigh immediate gains and
undervalue long-term negative consequences and diminished maturity of judgment).
197. See Claudio Salas, Note, The Case for Excluding the Criminal Confessions of the
Mentally Ill, 16 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 243, 265–66 (2004) (“Mental illness makes people
suggestible and susceptible to the slightest forms of pressure; coercion can take place
much more easily, and in situations that a ‘normal’ person might not find coercive.
The police can much more easily take advantage of the trust and dependence that
develops between a confessor and confessant when questioning someone who is
mentally ill. This trust and dependence on the part of a suspect will make it
impossible for him to understand the true, adversarial context of his interrogation
and possible confession.”). Note that the inquiry here of whether someone who is
mentally ill or handicapped is particularly vulnerable to having her autonomy
interests impinged by the State is different from the question of whether she has
been subject to government coercion sufficient to give rise to a constitutional
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mentally handicapped have difficulty recognizing when they are in an
adversarial situation with authority figures and are particularly
susceptible to agreeing to the wishes of those in positions of
198
The vulnerabilities of these classes of potential
authority.
informants unquestionably arise from immutable personal
characteristics and therefore deserve protection.
Drug addicts and alcoholics also are particularly vulnerable to
coercion and harm. In addition to typical pressures felt by all
potential informants from the threat of a lengthy prison sentence if
they do not cooperate, potential informants who are addicts face the
short-term concern of experiencing acute withdrawal symptoms
199
should they refuse to cooperate and be jailed.
The threat of
withdrawal may be sufficiently severe to render the agreement to
cooperate involuntary and to force such potential informants into
200
unnecessarily dangerous situations.
The difficult question,
however, is whether the addict’s vulnerability to potential coercion is
a sufficiently direct result of a knowing and voluntary choice, thus
extinguishing her entitlement to society’s protection.
Obviously, an individual’s addiction in almost every case is the
result of a voluntary choice, at some point, to begin using intoxicants.
Still, that choice also likely occurred a substantial time in the past, as
201
addictions tend to develop over time.
The more crucial issue is
violation. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (holding that coercive
police activity is a prerequisite to a finding that a confession was not made
voluntarily). As the Court explained in Connelly, the constitutional question focuses
on the actions of the police, not on whether an individual’s actions were the result of
“‘free choice’ in any broader sense of the word.” Id. at 170. Thus, a mentally ill
individual’s decision to assist the police may not be the product of her free will in
some sense without the police’s conduct meeting the constitutional standard of
government coercion.
198. See Morgan Cloud et al., Words Without Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions,
and Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 495, 511–13 (2002) (reviewing
literature recognizing that the mentally handicapped are “unusually susceptible to
the perceived wishes of authority figures,” “are unable to discern when they are in an
adversarial situation, especially with police officers,” and often “overrate their
skills”).
199. Kevin Fiscella et al., Benign Neglect or Neglected Abuse: Drug and Alcohol
Withdrawal in U.S. Jails, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 129, 131 (2004) (“Acute drug and
alcohol withdrawal is distinguished from most other medical conditions in that the
onset of symptoms typically coincides with arrest and detention.”).
200. See Commonwealth v. Paszko, 461 N.E.2d 222, 230 (Mass. 1984) (collecting
cases and recognizing that confessions made during drug withdrawal may be
involuntary); Fiscella et al., supra note 199, at 131 (“The threat of withdrawal
associated with continued detention can implicitly serve to coerce arrestees into
providing information they might not otherwise volunteer.”); Douglas N. Husak,
Addiction and Criminal Liability, 18 LAW & PHIL. 655, 658–59 (1999) (arguing that the
pain caused by withdrawal could satisfy the threat of harm element of a duress
defense to a charge of illegal drug use).
201. See Raymond Anton, Substance Abuse Is a Disease of the Human Brain: Focus on
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whether continued addiction is properly viewed as a voluntary choice.
Scientific literature tends to view addiction as a disease and thus out
202
203
of the addict’s control, though there are dissenting voices.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court, in striking down a statute
204
criminalizing narcotics addiction, suggested in Robinson v. California
205
Thus, support certainly
that it may support the disease model.
exists for the conclusion that society has a duty to protect drug
206
addicts from the vulnerability that arises from their addiction.
The potential informant who is intoxicated at the time she is asked
to cooperate also presents a thorny problem. Intoxication can cause
both cognitive and volitional impairments, leading the intoxicated
individual to misunderstand what is occurring and to be less able to
207
control her actions. As a result, the intoxicated potential informant
is vulnerable to coercion by State agents to cooperate in situations
where the resulting danger may have dissuaded her had she been
sober. But should this vulnerability be protected? Put another way,
did the potential informant choose to suffer the vulnerabilities of
intoxication on the given occasion?
As noted above, the scientific community largely views addiction as
a disease that impairs the volitional capacity of the addict or
alcoholic, thus making it difficult for her not to abuse the object of
Alcohol, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 735, 737 (2010) (reporting that alcoholism, for
example, develops slowly, over the course of ten or even twenty years); Alan I.
Leshner, Addiction Is a Brain Disease, and It Matters, 278 SCI. 45, 46 (1997) (explaining
that drug abuse causes persuasive changes to brain function that last long after the
period of addiction).
202. See David M. Eagleman et al., Why Neuroscience Matters for Rational Drug Policy,
11 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 7, 15–19 (2010) (explaining that brain dysfunction
eventually impairs impulse control and the ability to act volitionally); Fentiman, supra
note 99, at 234 & n.4 (reiterating the perception that drug addicts are the
“choiceless victims of their illness,” including the concept of people who behave
compulsively despite adverse consequences).
203. See Fentiman, supra note 99, at 246–47 (discussing recent research suggesting
that continued addiction is the result, at least in part, of the individual’s failure to
make the choice to stop using the addictive good).
204. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
205. See id. at 666–67 (likening a statute that criminalized narcotic addiction to
one that would outlaw mental illness and holding that imprisonment under the
addiction statute constituted cruel and unusual punishment).
206. As noted supra notes 99–109 and accompanying text, the entitlement of a
given vulnerability to protection is often a complex normative question. It is beyond
the scope of this Article to resolve that question in an area as hotly contested as drug
addiction.
207. See Cynthia Calkins Mercado et al., Decision-Making About Volitional Impairment
in Sexually Violent Predators, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 587, 589 (2006) (“[C]onsiderable
physiological and neuroscience research seems to support a link between alcohol
and substance use and impairment in the inhibitory and activational aspects of
behavioral control.”); Steven S. Nemerson, Alcoholism, Intoxication, and the Criminal
Law, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 393, 405, 429 (1988) (explaining that consuming high
quantities of alcohol reduces behavioral inhibitions).
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208

the addiction. Nevertheless, difficulty in controlling one’s actions is
not the same as an inability to do so, and the decision to abuse on a
209
given occasion is volitional despite the influence of addiction. For
example, even if a cocaine addict uses cocaine in response to an
incredibly strong desire, the decision to use is still a choice, and it is
one undertaken with full knowledge of its impact on the addict’s
210
cognitive and volitional abilities.
In this vein, substantive criminal law provides little leeway to
addicts. Addiction generally provides no defense to charges of illegal
211
intoxication, and voluntary intoxication is rarely a defense to any
212
crime, even if the defendant is an addict.
Similarly, those
recovering from addiction are entitled to protection from
employment discrimination, but those currently taking illegal drugs
213
are not.
This analysis thus suggests a meaningful distinction between
intoxication and addiction.
Both result from an individual’s
voluntary choice, but the decision that led to the addiction is
sufficiently distant in time that the individual can no longer be said to
have voluntarily subjected herself to the vulnerabilities arising from
it. On the other hand, the decision to be intoxicated on a given
occasion, though possibly influenced by addiction, is recent enough
that the individual is responsible for knowingly making herself
vulnerable to harm. Consequently, an addict deserves protection

208. See supra note 202 and accompanying text (exploring addiction as an organic
dysfunction rather than the mischievous result of poor decision-making).
209. See Stephen J. Morse, Addiction, Genetics, and Criminal Responsibility, 69 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 165, 184–85 (2006) (arguing that analogies that presuppose
mechanistic behavior mischaracterize strong addictive desires by mistaking extreme
difficulty of impulse control for physical lack of it).
210. See id. at 193 (highlighting the fact that addicts have lucid thoughts both
before and during addiction and almost always remain cognizant of the risks to
decision-making).
211. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535 (1968) (plurality opinion) (“We are
unable to conclude, on the state of this record or on the current state of medical
knowledge, that chronic alcoholics in general, and Leroy Powell in particular, suffer
from such an irresistible compulsion to drink and to get drunk in public that they
are utterly unable to control their performance of either or both of these acts and
thus cannot be deterred at all from public intoxication.”).
212. See generally Donald A. Dripps, Recreational Drug Regulation: A Plea for
Responsibility, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 117, 122–26 (discussing why addiction does not
constitute a defense and concluding that the ultimate choice to seek treatment
theoretically remains available).
213. See Stephen F. Befort & Holly Lindquist Thomas, The ADA in Turmoil: Judicial
Dissonance, the Supreme Court’s Response, and the Future of Disability Discrimination Law,
78 OR. L. REV. 27, 46 (1999) (noting that the ADA’s “safe harbor” clause does not
apply to people “currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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from vulnerabilities arising from her addiction, but not from her
immediate intoxication.
IV. PATERNALISM AND MORAL HARM
The preceding account provides a portrait of the vulnerabilities
faced by potential informants in the current environment of nonregulation. Efforts to protect informants against vulnerabilities to
harm —some of which will be advocated for in more detail below —
will inevitably restrict, either directly or indirectly, the ability of some
214
Any such reforms thus raise
individuals to become informants.
additional autonomy concerns for the potential informant and are
paternalistic to the extent that they are justified in whole or in part by
215
the claim that they protect informant interests from harm.
This conflict between the potential informant’s interest in being
free from harm and her autonomy interests highlights two issues.
First, not all kinds of harm are equal. In particular, societal
protection against moral harm interferes doubly with individual
autonomy: not only do these protections inhibit the individual’s
ability to assess her own personal tolerance for risk and harm, but
they also impose majoritarian moral judgments on the individual.
Second, society must formulate some methodology to weigh the
competing interests. This Article addresses these questions in turn.
A. The Problem of Moral Harm
Potential informants are vulnerable to physical, social, and moral
216
harms as a result of their cooperation with law enforcement. Moral
harm is different from physical and social harm, however. “Harm,”
the prevention of which might justify restrictions on an individual’s
217
autonomy, requires some injury to an interest of the harmed. With
214. Of course, a variety of other grounds unrelated to the specific interests of
informants may also justify reforms of the informant system: minimizing inaccurate
outcomes, increasing law enforcement effectiveness, improving the perception of law
enforcement in communities, and minimizing law enforcement corruption. See
generally NATAPOFF, supra note 13, at 175–200 (proposing reforms on these grounds).
215. See Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paternalism/ (last updated June 1, 2010)
(defining paternalism broadly as “the interference of a state or an individual with
another person, against their will, and defended or motivated by a claim that the
person interfered with will be better off or protected from harm”). Though the
term “paternalism” often carries a negative connotation, the concept itself is nonnormative. Id.
216. See supra notes 116–28 and accompanying text (discussing various types of
vulnerabilities to which informants are susceptible).
217. See 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO
OTHERS 33–36 (1984) (concluding, after surveying various senses of “harm,” that
criminal law should address only wrongs that also set back interests).
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respect to physical harm, the interest at issue is straightforward and
218
The
universal: the interest in one’s physical health and life.
219
interests injured by social harm, as defined by this Article, are
similarly universal: the interests in one’s psychological well-being,
ability to maintain social relationships, and minimal economic
220
stability.
On the other hand, the interest threatened by moral harm is one’s
221
interest in being good.
Unlike one’s interest in avoiding physical
injury or death, or in making a minimal living, one’s interest in being
good is highly individualized. Disagreements will arise both over
222
whether a particular activity is in fact morally harmful to the actor
223
and over how much moral harm an activity will cause. As a result,
attempts to protect an individual from moral harm impose a greater
restraint on her liberty than efforts to protect her from physical or
social harm. Not only do such attempts interfere with the individual’s
freedom of action, they also impinge on her entitlement to assess
224
what constitutes morally harmful activity. Moreover, attempting to
protect against moral harms runs the risk of imposing an inaccurate
225
In other words, when two groups differ about
moral judgment.
whether a particular activity causes moral harm to the actor, there is a
danger in imposing the will of one over the other in that the winning
226
side may simply be wrong.
In the context of informants, the issue of moral harm is particularly
complicated.
For instance, the informant may perceive his
cooperation as disloyal, and thus immoral, and suffer “moral harm”

218. See id. at 37 (listing possible welfare interests broadly distinguishable as either
physical or emotional).
219. See supra notes 125–28 and accompanying text (discussing social harms that
may result from an individual’s cooperation with police).
220. See FEINBERG, supra note 217, at 37 (sorting interests broadly as “welfare” and
“ulterior,” with the former being the most important).
221. Id. at 69–70.
222. See 4 JOEL FEINBERG, MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS
WRONGDOING 308 (1988) (discussing moral relativism).
223. See Robert G. Bone, Procedure, Participation, Rights, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1011, 1022–
24 (2010) (criticizing attempts to correlate the degree of moral disapprobation with
the allocation of resources).
224. See FEINBERG, supra note 222, at 309 (“When we give moral license to state
enforcement of the majority will, overruling individual autonomy even in matters
that do not violate the rights of others, that is unfair in itself . . . .”).
225. Id. at 310.
226. These concerns about moral harm therefore are not morally relativistic;
rather, they recognize that genuine disagreements exist about the moral
wrongfulness of certain activities and place substantial value on individuals’ interests
in resolving these disagreements. See id. at 308–10 (suggesting that because
individuals disagree about moral norms, legal enforcement of moral norms is
unfair).
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227

But the judgment of whether an individual has acted
as a result.
disloyally is highly individualized. Thus, it is possible for an
individual informant to feel she has acted disloyally when mainstream
228
society does not agree and for society more generally to perceive
229
cooperation as disloyal even though the informant does not agree.
Assuming the majority outlaws cooperation that it perceives to be
morally wrong, such a law would not prevent the informant in the
former case from cooperating and suffering moral harm. In contrast,
the law would prevent the latter informant from cooperating even
though she would suffer no such harm, thus impinging on her
autonomy interests without any commensurate benefit.
Moral harm also may arise from requiring the informant to engage
in more serious criminal conduct than that she is accused of
230
committing, thus desensitizing her to greater criminality.
The
extent of this moral harm is also highly individualized. Some
informants may be minor criminals forced to commit much more
serious offenses, while others may be hardened criminals against
whom the police only have evidence of minor offenses. Moreover,
some minor criminals may have little interest in their own goodness,
while some who have committed more serious offenses may
nonetheless maintain strong moral boundaries that are subject to
corrosion. Thus, a law targeting this kind of harm by forbidding the
use of those charged with minor crimes as informants would fail to
protect some informants who would suffer moral harm and protect
others who are not at risk. For these reasons, protections against
moral harm should be avoided, or, if they are deemed necessary, such
protections must be exceedingly well-tailored.

227. See Simons, supra note 13, 28–29 (stating that even though informants’
actions benefit society, there is nevertheless a disdain for their own willingness to
betray others).
228. The “Stop Snitching” phenomenon in some high-crime communities
provides an example of this disconnect. In such communities, individuals who
cooperate against other community members often perceive their cooperation to be
immoral, while members of mainstream society believe that cooperation is proper.
See Rich, supra note 12 (manuscript at 21–27) (noting that when a witness in a highcrime community refuses to be a “snitch,” mainstream society views this as disloyal in
regards to the enforcement of criminal law).
229. For instance, an informant who feels no special obligation to her son will not
feel that she has been disloyal by cooperating with the police against him. But
society more generally will believe that the informant has been disloyal because of
the widely-held belief about the obligations of a mother to her son. See id.
(manuscript at 10–11) (utilizing the normative view that a son and a mother have a
certain relationship where there is expected to be a high degree of loyalty).
230. See supra notes 120–23 and accompanying text.
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B. How Much Paternalism?
Turning then to the question of whether and to what extent
231
paternalism is appropriate, answers run along a spectrum.
At one
end, libertarians embrace autonomy above all else; consequently,
232
they deplore paternalism.
At the other end are so-called “hard”
paternalists, who would permit the government to prevent dangerous
but self-regarding activities, even when such activities are conducted
233
with the free and informed choice of the actor. A middle ground is
found in “soft” paternalism, which allows the State to prevent
dangerous, self-regarding behavior only when it is non-voluntary or
when intervention is necessary to establish whether the action in
234
question is voluntary.
To further understand these distinctions, take John Stuart Mill’s
classic example of a traveler with whom we cannot communicate, and
235
who is about to walk across a damaged bridge.
A strict libertarian
would oppose any government interference on the ground that the
traveler is bound to harm no one but herself and is free to do so,
while a paternalist would believe that stopping her is appropriate to
236
prevent injury. If, after the person is stopped, it is revealed that she
is both competent and aware of the danger but nevertheless wishes to
proceed, the soft paternalist would permit her to do so because her
237
assumption of the risk is voluntary.
Meanwhile, a hard paternalist
would argue that stopping even the knowledgeable and competent
238
traveler may be permissible in some circumstances.
In the case of the potential criminal informant, the strict
libertarian, anti-paternalistic view is unsuited to the importance of the
rights at issue.
Unlike a commercial free-market transaction
231. For a more complete discussion of definitions and perspectives on legal
paternalism, see 3 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO
SELF 3-26 (1986).
232. See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1160 (2003) (describing traditional
libertarianism).
233. See Joel Feinberg, Paternalism, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 137–38
(Donald M. Borchert ed., Supp. 1996).
234. Id. at 138. The soft paternalist’s consideration of voluntariness includes
contemplation of conditions affecting an actor’s capacity, such as the influence of
drugs, age, or mental impairment. See FEINBERG, supra note 231, at 12 (noting that
soft paternalism stresses the voluntariness of a person’s actions).
235. See MILL’S ON LIBERTY: A CRITICAL GUIDE 215 (C. L. Ten ed., 2008)
(explaining that a public officer could stop a man from crossing an unsafe bridge
because the man’s desire would not be to fall off the bridge).
236. See Dworkin, supra note 215 (distinguishing between the hard and soft
paternalist in the context of John Stuart Mills’ bridge example).
237. Id.
238. Id.
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involving the sale of goods, the potential informant is engaged with
the State in a negotiation that implicates her freedom, her right to
239
When the criminal
trial, her right to counsel, and her safety.
informant agrees to cooperate, she foregoes those protections, at
240
least temporarily, and is placed in a position where she must choose
either to collaborate with the State or to face criminal prosecution.
At a minimum, some guarantee should be made that the informant’s
decision to cooperate is made freely and voluntarily.
The protections provided to the plea-bargaining defendant suggest
society’s unease with a purely laissez-faire approach to the waiver of
241
fundamental rights. Prior to a defendant pleading guilty, she must
be provided an opportunity to speak to counsel, and the court
considering the plea must make a record that establishes, at least at
some minimum level, that the pleading defendant has waived her
242
rights knowingly and voluntarily.
Of course, a strict libertarian
might argue that the informant’s freedom of choice is of the utmost
importance precisely because such foundational rights are at issue.
Yet, in the plea bargaining context, even libertarian academics have
recognized that “[l]iberty is too important to be allocated by
unregulated bargaining. The potential for irrationality and mistake
to work irrevocable, life-destroying injustice is too high not to police
243
the bargain.”
On the other hand, a hard paternalist response —namely, a
complete ban on the use of criminal informants to protect informant
interests—also goes too far. To justify a flat ban, all informants

239. See Rich, supra note 21, at 695 (noting that cooperation agreements lack the
safeguards that attach to a formal plea and do not involve judicial oversight).
240. Should the informant fail to cooperate to the State’s satisfaction and is
prosecuted, these rights will not have been waived.
241. Indeed, the fact that certain fundamental rights, such as the Eighth
Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment and the Thirteenth
Amendment right to be free of involuntary servitude, cannot be waived suggests that
a certain level of paternalism pervades our constitutional government. See Anthony
T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 780 (1983)
(arguing that restrictions on one’s freedom of contract, including one’s ability to
enter into a contract of self-enslavement, are best justified by the threat that such
contracts pose to “the promisor’s integrity or self-respect”); Kimberly A. Yuracko,
Education Off the Grid: Constitutional Restraints on Homeschooling, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 123,
153–54 (2008) (stating that waivers of constitutional rights should not be permissible
when they do harm to broader social functions and government protections). But see
Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1387–88 (1984) (arguing that the nonwaivability of these
rights is better justified on non-paternalist grounds).
242. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; see Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261–62 (1971)
(affirming Rule 11’s requirement that states a federal court must develop, on the
record, the factual basis for the defendant’s plea).
243. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 111, at 1930.
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would have to suffer a net harm as a result of cooperation. This
seems unlikely. Many informants successfully cooperate in exchange
244
for promised leniency without suffering any physical harm.
Moreover, some informants successfully cooperate with law
245
enforcement without their cooperation being discovered.
These
informants will not be subject to the social harm that accompanies
246
Finally, the moral harms potentially
the discovery of cooperation.
suffered by an informant are highly individualized and ill-suited to
247
government protection.
Consequently, no matter how strongly or
weakly one values an informant’s autonomy interests, at least in some
cases the benefits to the informant of permitting cooperation will
outweigh the harm.
Alternatively, a flat ban could be justified if the aggregate harm
suffered by all informants as a result of cooperation outweighs the
aggregate benefit and if it is impossible to tailor reforms with greater
precision to ameliorate the harms without eradicating the benefits.
The first condition requires a balancing of the harms and benefits to
informants that is a difficult, if not impossible, normative and
empirical task well beyond the scope of this Article. Fortunately,
reforms can be crafted that might alleviate the harmful impact of the
informant system on those criminal informants most likely to suffer a
net harm while preserving the net benefit to the remainder. These

244. Despite the numerous published reports of informants who are injured or
killed as a result of their cooperation with police, those reports pale in comparison to
the hundreds of thousands of informants who are estimated to be active at any given
time. See Natapoff, supra note 16, at 657 (noting that there are hundreds of
thousands of informants who are guarded with protection and as a result, harm
would be hard to inflict upon them). Moreover, with respect to the question of
whether informants actually receive leniency, a large percentage of sentenced federal
defendants have been granted substantial assistance departures under the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SENTENCES RELATIVE TO THE
GUIDELINE RANGE BY EACH PRIMARY OFFENSE CATEGORY (2010), available at
www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/
2010/Table27.pdf (reporting that 9421 federal defendants, or 11.5% of all
defendants, received downward departures for substantial assistance).
245. As with all empirical matters regarding informants, it is impossible to discern
precisely how often an informant’s cooperation is not discovered. Nonetheless, law
enforcement guidelines forbidding agents from revealing the identity of informants
suggest that it should not be a rare occurrence. See DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 189,
at 6, 11–13 (providing protections for criminal informants, including confidentiality
and possible immunity, that can be granted if informants provide truthful
information).
246. See supra notes 125–28 and accompanying text (noting that criminal
informants also risk social harm in addition to any physical harm that may be
incurred).
247. See supra notes 216–40 and accompanying text (stating that a moral harm
may be suffered by an informant resulting from societal pressures, both in their own
community and in mainstream society).
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248

reforms, set forth below, largely take the form of so-called “soft”
paternalistic measures aimed at enhancing the voluntariness of the
decisions made by potential informants.
V. CURRENT PROTECTIONS FOR ACTIVE CRIMINAL INFORMANTS
Despite society’s general disapproval and law enforcement’s
disdain, the interests of criminal informants are not entirely
unprotected. That said, available safeguards protect only a small
minority of criminal informants effectively, and such safeguards
minimally shield the interests of the vast majority. Moreover, most
are unintended side-effects of law enforcement policies created to
serve law enforcement interests and thus continue only so long as
they forward those interests.
A. Witness Protection Programs
The most widely-known protection available to criminal informants
are the witness protection programs found in many jurisdictions. Of
these, the most comprehensive and best-funded is the federal Witness
249
Security Program. It empowers the United States Attorney General
to protect and relocate those individuals, including criminals, who
250
might serve as witnesses in the prosecution of any “serious offense.”
Among other things, the Attorney General may provide the witness
and her family with a new identity, housing, employment, and cash
payments, and may refuse to disclose the identity or location of the
251
protected individuals. Various state governments also have witness
protection programs that can be used to protect criminal
252
informants.
Witness protection programs are limited in the protection that they
provide to informants in three ways. First, they protect only a small
253
minority of cooperating witnesses.
These witnesses tend to be
248. See infra Part VI (proposing reforms that increase the information available to
potential informants and protect their ability to choose whether to cooperate).
249. See 18 U.S.C. § 3521 (2006) (allowing for the provision of relocation and
protective services by the Attorney General to potential witnesses).
250. Id. § 3521(a)(1).
251. Id. § 3521(b)(1).
252. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 14020 (West 2011) (creating a witness relocation
and assistance program); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-30-1 (2011) (same); VA. CODE ANN. §
52-35 (2012) (same).
253. See Nora V. Demleitner, Immigration Threats and Rewards: Effective Law
Enforcement Tools in the “War” Against Terrorism?, 51 EMORY L.J. 1059, 1077 (2002)
(“While the Federal Witness Protection Program presents an opportunity to grant
noncitizens the right to live and work in the United States, it is numerically
restricted, expensive, and may not suit the needs of many individuals who cooperate
with law enforcement.”). For instance, in the forty years since its enactment in 1971,
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“high-value” informants, i.e. those who can provide substantial
254
Second,
information relevant to particularly serious prosecutions.
witness protection programs protect only the person and immediate
family of “witnesses,” meaning those informants who are expected to
255
testify in court.
Many active criminal informants are never
256
expected to testify, however, and thus are ineligible for protection.
Third, witness protection programs provide only physical protection
to informants. They are not designed to protect against informants
257
from the potential moral and social harms of cooperation.
B. Internal Law Enforcement Policies
The most robust law enforcement guidelines governing the use of
criminal informants are those issued by the Department of Justice
258
(DOJ) and applicable to federal law enforcement agencies.
The
the Witness Security Program has provided protection to more than 8300 witnesses
and their family members. See U.S. MARSHALS SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT
SHEET: WITNESS SECURITY (2011), available at http://www.usmarshals.gov/duties/
factsheets/witsec-2011.pdf. The California Witness Relocation and Protection
Program, one of the most prolific state witness protection programs, serves at most
hundreds of witnesses each year. See CAL. S. RULES COMM., BILL ANALYSIS, S. 2007-594,
1st Sess., at 4–5 (reporting that 388 new witness protection cases were opened during
fiscal year 2004–2005, according to the Department of Justice). The Massachusetts
Witness Protection Program protected 167 witnesses in its first three years. MASS.
EXEC. OFFICE OF PUB. SAFETY & SEC., THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS WITNESS
PROTECTION PROGRAM: AN OVERVIEW OF CASES DURING FISCAL YEAR 2007, 2008, AND
2009, at 7 (2010), available at http://www.mass.gov/eopss/docs/eops/fy-09-witnessprotection-analysis-no-appendix.pdf. Though not insubstantial, the number of
protected witnesses, many of whom may not be informants, pales in comparison to
the estimated hundreds of thousands of criminal informants who are active at any
given time. See Natapoff, supra note 16, at 657 (noting that many of the defendants
who cooperate receive no credit at all).
254. See 18 U.S.C. § 3521(c) (requiring the Attorney General to assess, inter alia,
“the seriousness of the investigation or case in which the person’s information or
testimony has been or will be provided” and “the relative importance of the person’s
testimony”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 14023 (“The Attorney General shall give priority to
matters involving organized crime, gang activities, drug trafficking, human
trafficking, and cases involving a high degree of risk to the witness.”); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 52-35 (limiting protection to those who provide information about serious violent
felonies, felony drug offenses, domestic violence, and certain sexual assaults).
255. See 18 U.S.C. § 3521(c) (requiring the Attorney General to consider the value
of the potential witness’ testimony); id. § 3521(d)(1) (requiring the Attorney
General to obtain the agreement of the witness or potential witness “to testify in . . .
all appropriate proceedings”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 14021(a) (defining “witness” to
mean only those persons reasonably expected to be summoned to testify in a
criminal matter).
256. See NATAPOFF, supra note 13, at 18–23 (detailing the processes involved in
police recruitment of informants and asserting that a great deal of prosecutorial
discretion is exercised over the informant’s ultimate fate).
257. Indeed, to the extent that informants are uprooted from their communities,
moved to new locations, and provided new identities through a witness protection
program, the social harm they suffer is substantial.
258. DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 189.
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DOJ Guidelines provide some protections for criminal informants.
They impose a duty of candor on agents in their dealings with
informants and forbid law enforcement agents from promising
immunity or giving the erroneous impression that they have the
259
authority to do so.
Moreover, in recruiting a potential informant,
an agent must consider factors including the person’s age, her history
of substance abuse, and the risk of physical harm to the informant
260
should she cooperate. A supervisor must then approve the agent’s
261
After the informant has agreed to
suitability determination.
cooperate, the agent is required to review the terms of the agreement
262
with her and in the presence of a witness.
These terms include a
promise that the government will “strive to protect the [informant’s]
identity” and the recognition that the agent is not authorized to
263
promise the informant immunity.
Finally, when deciding whether
to authorize the informant’s engagement in criminal activity, the
relevant law enforcement agent must consider, inter alia, the
anticipated extent of the informant’s participation in the activity and
264
the risk that the informant will suffer physical injury.
On their face, these protections appear substantial. By forcing
agents to consider the potential harm to the informant from
cooperation generally and from engagement in authorized criminal
activity specifically, the guidelines protect the informant’s interest in
avoiding physical harm.
By requiring consideration of the
informant’s age and substance abuse history, they permit recognition
that young or addicted informants may be less capable of making an
informed decision to cooperate. Similarly, the duty of candor, the
ban on false promises of immunity, and the requirement that the
terms of cooperation be reviewed with the informant enhance the
likelihood that the informant’s decision to cooperate is made
knowingly and voluntarily. The requirement that decisions about
informant suitability be reviewed by a supervisor ensures that the
guidelines are followed.
The DOJ Guidelines provide only the opportunity for the protection
of informant interests, however, and the realities of law enforcement
265
discourage agents from prioritizing those interests.
Though some
259. Id. at 5.
260. Id. at 8–9.
261. Id. at 8.
262. Id. at 11.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 21.
265. Moreover, the DOJ Guidelines explicitly state that they create no right of
enforcement by confidential informants. Id. at 7.
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of the guideline requirements are strict, such as the prohibition on
offers of immunity, most leave substantial discretion to law
enforcement agents. For instance, the guidelines list seventeen
factors to be considered in determining the suitability of a potential
informant, only two of which suggest concern for informant
266
No standard is provided for how those factors
vulnerabilities.
should be weighed, and most focus the agent’s attention on the
267
informant’s potential utility to law enforcement.
Likewise, the
guidelines require an agent to consider seven factors in deciding
whether to authorize the informant to engage in criminal activity,
only one of which touches on the informant’s interests, and the
guidelines provide no standards for how those factors should be
268
weighed.
At the same time that the guidelines leave substantial discretion in
the hands of federal agents, those agents are subject to pressures to
269
gather evidence, make cases, and obtain convictions. For instance,
the most common measure of an agent’s performance is her
clearance rate, the rate at which she manages to satisfactorily close
reported crimes, either through apprehension of the perpetrator or a
270
determination that the offender cannot be apprehended.
These
clearance rates matter not only to the agent’s direct supervisor; they
also are reported publicly and can form a basis for public pressure on
271
the agency. Additionally, limited resources put pressure on agents
272
Considered together, these
to clear cases quickly and efficiently.
pressures suggest that when agents are faced with a close call over the
suitability of a vulnerable informant or the potential risks to an
informant of authorizing criminal activity, they will be inclined to
make the decision in favor of using the informant or authorizing the
activity. Indeed, the FBI has come under fire for its persistent failure
266. See id. at 8–9 (requiring consideration of the potential informant’s age and
substance abuse history).
267. For instance, the guidelines require consideration of the potential
informant’s credibility, criminal history, the relevance of the information she could
provide, and the risk that she might adversely impact a current or future
investigations. Id.
268. Id. at 21.
269. See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel
Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 322–27 (describing the institutional
pressures on police to make arrests and obtain convictions); see also David W.
Rasmussen & Bruce L. Benson, Rationalizing Drug Police Under Federalism, 30 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 679, 721–22 (2003) (theorizing that utility-maximization encourages
police to prioritize making drug arrests).
270. Findley & Scott, supra note 269, at 325–26.
271. See id. at 324 (concluding that police administrators pressure officers to solve
as many cases as possible so the statistics released will bolster public opinion).
272. Id. at 325.
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273

Finally, institutional pressures to
to abide by the DOJ Guidelines.
favor law enforcement interests over informant interests are
reinforced by the underlying distaste many agents feel toward those
274
criminals who are willing to “snitch.”
Moreover, as noted previously, the DOJ Guidelines are the most
detailed law enforcement regulations on informant use. In many
jurisdictions, no guidelines exist at all. In others, guidelines are little
more than recordkeeping regulations with no provision for
275
consideration of informant interests.
Others follow the DOJ
approach of suggesting some consideration of the risks that
informants face but leave discretion in the hands of law enforcement
276
to ultimately weigh the importance of those risks. Finally, very few
277
As a result,
jurisdictions place hard limitations on informant use.
law enforcement agents in most jurisdictions have even more
discretion in the recruitment and handling of informants than
federal agents. In such a flexible, discretionary environment, the

273. See Dan Eggen, FBI Agents Often Break Informant Rules, WASH. POST, Sept. 13,
2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/12/
AR2005091201825.html (reporting on an internal investigation of compliance with
DOJ rules for handling confidential informants that found violations in eighty-seven
percent of cases); see also ACLU STUDY, supra note 1, at 30–32 (reporting results of a
law enforcement survey in which a majority of officers reported being unaware of the
existence of relevant policies on informant handling or failure to abide by them).
274. See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text (noting that many prosecutors
and police officers view criminal informants with disdain and low regard).
275. See, e.g., Omer Gillham, TPD Releases Drug-Case Policies, TULSA WORLD, Aug. 8,
2010, http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?subjectid=11&articleid=
20100808 _11_A1_USAtto839786&allcom=1 (setting forth the informant guidelines
of the Tulsa, Oklahoma police department).
276. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 914.28(5) (2011) (requiring, among other things, that
agents consider the age and maturity of a potential informant and the risk of physical
harm during the recruitment process).
277. Inflexible limits on informant use are difficult to enact because they
inevitably face opposition from law enforcement groups that contend that tightened
restrictions on law enforcement discretion will result in less effective law
enforcement. For instance, Florida legislators introduced a bill in 2009 that would
have required that potential informants be given an opportunity to consult with
counsel and forbade the use of certain classes of informants. H.R. 271, 2009 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2009). The more restrictive provisions of the bill met substantial law
enforcement opposition on the grounds that they would impede investigations and
endanger informants by involving individuals outside of law enforcement in their
recruitment and use. See FLA. H.R., STAFF ANALYSIS, H. 2009-271, at 6 (Feb. 20, 2009)
(reporting criticism from the Florida Sheriff’s Association and the Florida
Department of Law Enforcement). As passed, the bill stripped away any strict limits
on the use of informants. Jennifer Portman, Crist Signs “Rachel’s Law,” TALLAHASSEE
DEMOCRAT, May 8, 2009, at 1A. The only major jurisdiction that imposes any firm
limits on who can be an informant is California, which forbids the use of criminal
informants under the age of twelve and allows the use of criminal informants under
the age of eighteen only with court approval. See Dennis, supra note 36, at 1160–61
(explaining that a child must be found by a court to have voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently agreed to serve as an informant).
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institutional pressures to make arrests, coupled with the general
distaste of informants, are even more likely to overwhelm any
278
concern individual agents may feel about informant interests.
C. Legal Action
Successful civil claims by injured informants may deter government
action that puts them at risk. Such claims typically arise in one of two
ways. First, a criminal informant who has suffered injuries as a result
of her cooperation with law enforcement may allege a federal
constitutional claim; in addition, such an informant may allege a
279
federal or state law tort claim, based in statute or the common law.
Second, a criminal informant may claim improper police conduct as
a defense to criminal liability or cite it as a circumstance entitling her
280
to a lesser sentence.
1.

Civil claims
Though civil suits by informants against government agencies and
281
agents can be successful, they face significant legal hurdles. With
respect to statutory or common-law claims, most jurisdictions place
282
substantial limits on official liability.
At the federal level, the
Federal Tort Claims Act provides for a limited waiver of sovereign
immunity by which the federal government is liable in tort “in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to
283
judgment or for punitive damages.”
Moreover, the Act includes a
discretionary function exception, which excludes claims “based upon
the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
278. Cf. JOHN KLEINIG, THE ETHICS OF POLICING 93–94 (1996) (arguing that police
discretion must be restricted to comply with broader societal norms and calling for
an administrative rule to monitor police discretion).
279. See, e.g., Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 641 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(affirming a judgment awarding $530,000 in compensatory damages under the
Survival and Wrongful Death Acts in favor of the family of an informant who died
while engaged in drug buy planned at behest of police); McIntyre v. United States,
447 F. Supp. 2d 54, 60 (D. Mass. 2006) (holding federal government liable under
Federal Tort Claims Act for the wrongful death of criminal informant).
280. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting
that a defendant argued that an indictment should be dismissed because it alleged
crimes that had been authorized by federal agents); People v. Ruggiero, 920 N.Y.S.2d
226, 227–28 (App. Div. 2011) (remanding for resentencing upon finding that the
prosecution unilaterally changed the terms of the cooperation agreement).
281. See McIntyre, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 120 (awarding over $3 million to family of
informant); see also Butera, 235 F.3d at 641 (affirming an award of more than
$500,000 in compensatory and punitive damages).
282. See Rich, supra note 21, at 701 n.123 (describing cases which limit police
liability).
283. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006).
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discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an
employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved
284
be abused.” State governments have enacted similar limitations on
285
the liability of their agencies and officials.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the discretionary function
exception to protect federal officials from liability so long as they do
not run afoul of a “federal statute, regulation, or policy [that]
286
specifically prescribes a course of action . . . to follow” and their
actions and decisions are “based on considerations of public
287
policy.” With respect to the first requirement for the application of
the exception, the use of informants is an area in which firm policies
288
are few and substantive discretion lies with law enforcement agents.
As for the second requirement, courts have found that decisions on
how to handle investigations and protect informants are based on
289
considerations of public policy. As a result, informants who allege
tort claims arising from injuries suffered while cooperating frequently
290
find their claims barred.
Informants making constitutional claims typically allege substantive
291
The first hurdle to these claims is the
due process violations.
284. Id. § 2680(a).
285. For state limitations on punitive damages, see, for example, HAW. REV. STAT. §
662-2 (2011); IOWA CODE § 669.4 (2011); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5522(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2012). With respect to state analogues of the discretionary
function exception, see, for example, ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.070(d)(2) (2012); GA.
CODE ANN. § 50-21-24(2) (2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-904(1) (2012); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 258, § 10(b) (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.032(2) (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE §
32-12.1-03(3)(d) (2011).
286. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322 (1991) (quoting Berkovitz v.
United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988)).
287. Id. at 323 (quoting Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 537).
288. See supra notes 269–78 and accompanying text (noting that there are few
guidelines in regulating informant use, and that the DOJ has published the most
comprehensive guidelines).
289. Shuler v. United States, 531 F.3d 930, 934 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting other
circuit court cases where the treatment of an informant was highly dependent on
public policy).
290. See, e.g., id. at 934–35 (dismissing a Federal Torts Claims Act action on
ground that law enforcement’s decision of when to arrest target of investigation falls
within the discretionary function exception); Vaughn v. City of Athens, 176 F. App’x
974, 979 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (dismissing claims under discretionary
function exception where the police used the arrestee, who was later murdered, to
arrange drug buys); Best v. United States, 522 F. Supp. 2d 252, 260–61 (D.D.C. 2007)
(dismissing a claim on the ground that law enforcement’s decision about how to
protect the informant fell within the discretionary authority exception). But see Litif
v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 2d 60, 81 (D. Mass. 2010) (finding that the
discretionary function exception did not apply to shield an FBI agent’s decision to
leak the name of an informant).
291. See Rich, supra note 21, at 701–02 (explaining that an injured informant is
more likely to succeed with a substantive due process claim founded upon the Fifth
or Fourteenth Amendments).
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general bar on constitutional claims for injuries inflicted by third
292
Informants attempt to overcome this bar by arguing that
parties.
the government is liable under the “special relationship” and “state293
Some circuits reject these claims
created danger” doctrines.
outright when they are brought by informants on the ground that
informants voluntarily assume any risks that arise from cooperating
294
with the government. Even in those jurisdictions where such claims
could succeed, the plaintiff still must establish that the government
conduct met the substantive due process “shocks the conscience”
295
296
standard. This standard is amorphous in any context, but in the
informant arena, courts have been especially deferential to
297
discretionary decisions by police.
And even when police conduct
might shock the conscience, qualified immunity poses another
298
potential hurdle to recovery, albeit one that may diminish over
299
time.
292. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198
(1989) (noting that the state has affirmative duties of care and protection only in
limited circumstances under the Constitution).
293. Rich, supra note 21, at 702.
294. Id. at 703 n.132 (surveying cases where courts denied informants relief
stemming from injuries sustained based on their role as informants).
295. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846–47 (1998) (defining the
notion of “shocks the conscience” as being so vulgar and offensive as not to comply
with traditional standards of decency).
296. See id. at 861–62 (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the “shocks the
conscience” test for permitting arbitrariness in judicial decision-making while
forbidding it in executive or legislative action); Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d
1296, 1308 (3d Cir. 1994) (calling the “shocks the conscience” test an “amorphous
and imprecise inquiry”).
297. See Matican v. City of New York, 524 F.3d 151, 158–59 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding
that police actions in planning a sting that revealed an informant’s identity did not
shock the conscience because it was the result of police decision-making that
involved the balancing of concern for their own safety against concern for the
informant’s).
298. See Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 647–52 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(dismissing a substantive due process claim based on police failure to protect an
informant from a state-created danger on the ground that, while a due process
violation may have occurred, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because
an informant’s right to be protected from such a danger was not clearly established).
299. Theoretically, as courts render decisions and the obligations of law
enforcement agents with respect to informants become “clearly established,” the
qualified immunity defense will no longer be available to those agents who fail to
fulfill them. See Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2031 (2011) (recognizing lower
court discretion in deciding when to address constitutional questions in the qualified
immunity context “so as to promote ‘the law’s elaboration from case to case’”)
(quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). In applying the qualified
immunity doctrine, however, Supreme Court decisions suggest that the standard for
demonstrating that a right has been clearly established is a stringent one that
tolerates substantial errors in judgment by law enforcement. See Andrew M. Siegel,
The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the
Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1131 & n.123 (2006) (framing the
qualified immunity doctrine as a product of judicial culture). Coupled with this
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2.

Arguments in an informant’s criminal case
Criminal informants also seek to protect their interests by raising
claims of mistreatment in the context of any criminal charges
brought against them. These claims take the form of either a defense
to liability or an argument for reductions in sentence. With respect
to the former, criminal informants assert the related affirmative
300
defenses of public-authority and entrapment by estoppel.
The
public-authority defense requires the defendant to prove her
reasonable reliance on a public official’s directive to engage in
301
activity she knows to be illegal.
Similarly, entrapment by estoppel
requires that the defendant reasonably believed her conduct was
302
legal because of an official statement of the law.
These defenses face both doctrinal and practical hurdles.
Doctrinally, many jurisdictions will only allow these defenses if the
official who allegedly empowered the defendant to engage in the
303
illegal conduct had the actual authority to do so.
The absence of
standard, the relatively low volume of substantive due process cases brought by
informants suggests that qualified immunity will remain a significant hurdle to
recovery for quite some time.
300. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.3 (setting forth the required procedure for asserting
the public-authority defense); United States v. Strahan, 565 F.3d 1047, 1051 (7th Cir.
2009) (contrasting the public authority defense, which was claimed by the defendant,
and entrapment by estoppel, which is available to “a defendant who believed his
conduct legal because of an official’s statement of the law”); United States v. Giffen,
473 F.3d 30, 39–40 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting the relationship between entrapment by
estoppel and the public authority defense, the latter of which was claimed by the
defendant, a government informant, for each of the crimes charged); United States
v. Achter, 52 F.3d 753, 755 (8th Cir. 1995) (explaining the difference between the
two defenses, and holding that the defendant had provided insufficient evidence to
support either).
301. Strahan, 565 F.3d at 1051.
302. Id.; Achter, 52 F.3d at 755.
303. With respect to the public-authority defense, see Giffen, 473 F.3d at 39
(holding that a valid assertion of public-authority defense requires that the public
official who allegedly authorized conduct had actual authority to do so); United
States v. Fulcher, 250 F.3d 244, 253–54 (4th Cir. 2001) (same); United States v. Pitt,
193 F.3d 751, 758 (3d Cir. 1999) (same); Achter, 52 F.3d at 755 (same); United States
v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1368 n.18 (11th Cir. 1994) (same). But see
United States v. Jumah, 493 F.3d 868, 872 n.1 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing pattern jury
instructions on public-authority defense requiring only reasonable reliance on an
official’s statement, not actual authorization to approve of criminal activity). With
regard to entrapment by estoppel, see United States v. Spires, 79 F.3d 464, 466–67
(5th Cir. 1996) (requiring actual authority to interpret the relevant statute before a
defendant may claim entrapment by estoppel); United States v. Collins, 61 F.3d 1379,
1385 (9th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 83–84 (2d Cir.
1984) (same). But see Pitt, 193 F.3d at 758–59 (noting that “[t]he defense of
entrapment by estoppel turns on [the] credibility” of the government agent, and
“shifts the focus from the conduct of the defendant to the conduct of the
government”); United States v. Hedges, 912 F.2d 1397, 1405 (11th Cir. 1990)
(rejecting as irrelevant the government’s argument that the defendant could not
claim entrapment by estoppel because the official in question did not have authority
to authorize proscribed activity).
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informant guidelines creates a practical hurdle to proving such
authority, as public officials typically are not empowered to sanction
304
Moreover, even
criminal conduct without explicit authorization.
when an informant can claim that a public official had the power to
authorize the relevant criminal conduct, the issue of whether the
official in fact did so is often a disputed question of fact that calls for
the jury to evaluate the relative credibility of the official and the
305
informant.
A criminal informant is unlikely to prevail in such a
306
credibility contest.
Criminal informants also argue their entitlement to the benefits of
a cooperation agreement —namely, leniency in a criminal case —
under what is essentially a breach of contract theory. Though these
307
arguments are sometimes successful,
formal cooperation
agreements typically leave prosecutors with broad discretion to
decide whether an informant’s efforts merit leniency, and courts

304. For instance, the DOJ Guidelines on the use of informants authorize agents
to sanction criminal activity in only very limited situations and only with the written
and advance approval of a supervisor. See DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 189, at 20
(requiring that authorization of illegal activity occur within a ninety-day window and
be approved by specific field agents and prosecutors).
305. See United States v. Doe, 63 F.3d 121, 125 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that the
public-authority defense must be tried to a jury and is not a basis for dismissal of an
indictment).
306. See Rich, supra note 21, at 701 (asserting that the social positions of the
informant and the officer translate to credibility decisions generally being made
against the informant). In addition to the public-authority and entrapment by
estoppel defenses, courts have recognized that situations may arise where police
involvement in criminal conduct is so outrageous that convicting a defendant for
that conduct would violate due process. See United States v. Gurolla, 333 F.3d 944,
950 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that the defense of outrageous government conduct may
be used in extreme cases where “the government’s conduct violates fundamental
fairness”). The Due Process Clause is violated only where police conduct is
“shocking to the universal sense of justice,” however. Id. (quoting United States v.
Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431–32 (1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted). But see
United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 241 (7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the outrageous
government conduct defense). Given that no court has ever allowed a criminal
informant to invoke the outrageous government conduct defense and the high
standard of proof required to establish it, such application is unlikely in the future.
See Kenneth M. Lord, Entrapment and Due Process: Moving Toward a Dual System of
Defenses, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 463, 505–06 (1998) (noting that the outrageous
government conduct defense requires proof of “a significantly higher degree of
government misconduct” than entrapment).
307. See, e.g., Bowers v. State, 500 N.E.2d 203, 204 (Ind. 1986) (ordering the
dismissal of a case against a defendant as a result of a breach of a cooperation
agreement by the prosecutor on public policy grounds); People v. Jackson, 480
N.W.2d 283, 287 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding the dismissal of charges against
an informant who complied with agreement to provide information relating to a
bank robbery in exchange for immunity); People v. Delaney, 436 N.Y.S.2d 336, 337
(App. Div. 1981) (affirming the dismissal of an indictment where the defendant
established that he acted as an informant in an unrelated case upon a promise of
leniency from law enforcement officials).
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308

Meanwhile, oral
loathe interfering with that discretion.
cooperation agreements are difficult for criminal informants to
prove, as the issue of their existence often comes down to a pitched
battle of credibility between law enforcement agents and criminal
309
informants. Finally, even if the informant can prove the existence
of an agreement, law enforcement agents often do not have the
authority to promise leniency, thus leaving open the possibility that
310
such promises will prove to be unenforceable.
VI. PROTECTING ACTIVE CRIMINAL INFORMANTS
The preceding discussion demonstrates that substantial informant
interests in autonomy and safety are currently unprotected. Society
should protect many, but not all, of these interests in light of the
valuable service that informants provide and the lack of responsibility
that they often bear for their vulnerabilities. This Part discusses
policy proposals to protect those informant interests deserving of
protection while considering the costs of such policies in terms of
money, other resources, and harm to effective law enforcement, as
well as their political feasibility.
A. Providing Counsel to Potential Informants
The most straightforward way to ensure that potential informants’
autonomy interests are protected would be to provide them an
opportunity to consult with counsel while considering whether to
311
cooperate with law enforcement.
Defense counsel could remedy
the information asymmetry between law enforcement and potential
informants by guaranteeing that their clients are fully informed of
the risks and potential benefits of cooperation. They also could act as
a check on unduly coercive law enforcement tactics and assess the
capacity of their clients to cooperate effectively and safely. And
counsel could negotiate to ensure that cooperation agreements are
set forth in writing and in terms that are enforceable; in doing so,
they could provide their clients with the maximum possible
protection from harm. Finally, if such agreements are not honored
by law enforcement, counsel could step in to compel compliance.

308. Rich, supra note 21, at 700–01.
309. Id. at 701.
310. See supra note 186 and accompanying text (providing examples of cases in
which law enforcement agents’ lack of authority resulted in the unavailability of
immunity for the defendant).
311. See NATAPOFF, supra note 13, at 183–84 (proposing that counsel should be
made available to “uncharged suspects who are considering cooperation”).
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This is not to say that the opportunity to consult with counsel
would be a panacea. Distrust of appointed counsel is endemic
312
among criminals, and thus many potential informants may forego
their chance to consult. Moreover, in cases where cooperation is
informal, there is no obvious place for an institutional check on
313
whether the opportunity to consult was provided. Finally, the mere
presence of defense counsel may make opportunities for arrestees to
314
cooperate less available, thereby lessening their options.
Nevertheless, providing potential informants with the entitlement to
counsel would provide substantial protection against threats to the
autonomy and safety interests of informants.
Practical problems with this proposal cast serious doubt on its
feasibility, however. From a political standpoint, opposition to
providing counsel to criminal informants will be substantial,
particularly from law enforcement officials who will argue that the
315
involvement of counsel will hamper the informants’ effectiveness.
Even if such opposition could be overcome, any new entitlement to
counsel is unlikely to be funded. Currently, many jurisdictions do
not allocate sufficient funds to allow for the provision of appointed
316
counsel that satisfies the requirements of the Sixth Amendment.
Expanding the entitlement to counsel beyond the Sixth Amendment
requirements will exacerbate this problem and swell public
317
defenders’ already crushing caseloads. Thus, even if an entitlement
312. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2463, 2478 (2004) (noting that when it comes to appointed counsel, “clients
still believe the adage that you get what you pay for”).
313. This is to be distinguished from the plea bargaining context, where the plea
colloquy provides some guarantee that the defendant at least had an opportunity to
consult with counsel. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(D) (explaining that, in the plea
context, the court must inform the defendant of the right to be represented by
counsel).
314. See NATAPOFF, supra note 13, at 184 (hypothesizing that the presence of
counsel “might mean that fewer suspects would cooperate, and more might end up
being charged with crimes”). For instance, some defense attorneys are simply
unwilling to represent informants. See Richman, supra note 127, at 69–70 (providing
an example of an attorney who generally did not represent clients in cooperation
agreements with the government because he found such negotiations offensive).
315. See supra note 277 (discussing the opposition faced by a proposed law in
Florida requiring that potential informants be provided the opportunity to consult
with counsel).
316. See Heather Baxter, Gideon’s Ghost: Providing the Sixth Amendment Right to
Counsel in Times of Budgetary Crisis, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 341, 353–54 (explaining
that the recent recession has resulted in billions of dollars worth of budget cuts,
which has had a detrimental impact on funds allotted to indigent defense); Darryl K.
Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument from Institutional Design,
104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 802 (2004) (arguing that “[w]ithout [a] constitutional
mandate, legislatures fail to provide adequately for criminal defense”).
317. See Baxter, supra note 316, at 355–58 (providing data on the staggering
caseloads faced by public defenders).
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to counsel for potential informants could be passed, it is unlikely that
the vast majority of potential informants who are unable to pay for
their own counsel would receive a level of representation that realizes
318
the hoped-for benefits.
While at first blush, providing counsel to potential informants
seems to be an ideal broad-brush remedy for many informant
vulnerabilities, it is unlikely to be feasible. Rather, more targeted
proposals are needed.
B. Court Approval for the Use of Particularly Vulnerable Informants
As set forth above, certain classes of informants—minors, the
mentally handicapped and mentally ill, and drug addicts—are
particularly vulnerable to coercion and deserving of society’s
319
protection. One might argue, then, that the easiest way to protect
320
these informants would be to forbid their use entirely. But such a
proposal throws out the baby with the bathwater.
Though
particularly vulnerable to coercion, these individuals retain their
autonomy interest in making their own choices to the fullest extent
321
possible and with a minimum of government intervention.
Forbidding all members of these classes from becoming informants
destroys that interest in the name of saving them. That said, there
doubtlessly are some members of these classes who are so vulnerable
to coercion and so incapable of making informed and intelligent
decisions that their autonomy interests cannot be protected by any
322
informant use policy short of complete prohibition.
Thus, a
calibrated approach is needed.
318. Meanwhile, the autonomy and safety interests of those who can afford to pay
an attorney will receive greater protection. Such a result will only aggravate the
effect that a defendant’s financial resources have on criminal justice outcomes. See
Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1789–90 (2001)
(describing the lack of funding for indigent criminal defense and noting that “[o]nly
defendants who have celebrated cases or can meet steep charges . . . have ready
access to the highly skilled advocacy”).
319. See supra notes 195–202 and accompanying text (describing the susceptibility
of minors, the mentally handicapped, and the mentally ill).
320. For instance, proposed informant use rules in Florida would have prohibited
law enforcement from using as informants any individual currently in a drug
treatment program. See Portman, supra note 277, at 1A (describing how Florida’s
informant law requires law enforcement to consider a potential informant’s age and
maturity).
321. See Fallon, supra note 139, at 891 n.97 (noting how vulnerable classes such as
minors and the mentally handicapped still possess some level of autonomy and
associated “rights to personal sovereignty”).
322. Such a flat ban is analogous to regimes in the medical context that allow for
surrogate decision-making for patients unable to give informed consent. See generally
Norman L. Cantor, The Bane of Surrogate Decision-Making: Defining the Best Interests of
Never-Competent Persons, 26 J. LEGAL MED. 155 (2005) (describing the doctrine of parens
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1.

Juvenile informants
California’s “Chad’s Law,” which governs the use of minor
informants, sets forth such an approach by balancing these
323
informants’ safety and autonomy interests.
First, it provides
maximum protection to the youngest juveniles by completely
forbidding the use of informants who are twelve-years-old or
324
younger.
Second, it gives some assurance that an older juvenile’s
decision is voluntary and intelligent by requiring that law
enforcement disclose with the potential informant some crucial
information, such as the potential benefit of cooperating and the
325
sentence range that the juvenile might face if she does not inform.
Third, it lessens the risk that an innocent juvenile may be coerced
into cooperating through empty law enforcement threats by
requiring that a court find probable cause that the juvenile
committed the crime for which she has been offered leniency before
326
she can be used as an informant. Fourth, it diminishes the risk of
involuntary cooperation by requiring a court to consider the specific
characteristics of the juvenile, such as her age and maturity, and find
that the juvenile’s decision to cooperate is voluntary, knowing, and
327
intelligent. Finally, despite these protections, it preserves the core
of the juvenile’s autonomy interest by not replacing the juvenile’s
328
assessment of her best interests with a court’s.
Other jurisdictions
should adopt policies dictating similar procedures for the handling of
329
juvenile informants.
patriae, which in the medical context enables others to take over decision making for
individuals that are not medically competent). Unlike the medical context, however,
where the issue of identifying the proper treatment can be complex, the risks to
informants make it clear that those who are incapable of knowingly and voluntarily
deciding to cooperate should be forbidden from doing so.
323. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 701.5 (West 2011) (setting forth California’s regulation
of the use of minor informants, including certain conditions that must be met to
permit use of such informants).
324. Id. § 701.5(a).
325. Id. § 701.5(d).
326. Id.
327. Id. § 701.5(c).
328. Rather, the statute permits only the potential informant’s parent or legal
guardian to veto the juvenile’s decision to cooperate. See id. § 701.5(d)(4). This
limited intrusion on the juvenile’s autonomy interest is necessary to vindicate the
interest of parents in having control over the important decisions in their child’s life.
See Darci G. Osther, Note, Juvenile Informants—A Necessary Evil?, 39 WASHBURN L.J.
106, 125–26 (1999) (noting that a parent’s right to decide whether his or her child
may serve as an informant is integral to the right to make child-rearing decisions and
determine the best interests of his or her child).
329. This is not to say that Chad’s Law perfectly protects juvenile informants’
interests. For instance, it requires the court to consider factors—such as the severity
of the juvenile’s alleged offense and safety to the public—that are clearly irrelevant
to the court’s determination of whether the juvenile’s decision to cooperate is
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2.

Mentally ill and mentally handicapped informants
A similar approach should also be implemented for potential
informants who are mentally ill or mentally handicapped. The
central inquiry in permitting their use should be whether the
potential informant’s decision to cooperate is voluntary, knowing,
330
and intelligent.
This inquiry should involve consideration of the
specific characteristics of the informant and her situation and should
be entrusted to a neutral decision-maker, such as a judge or
magistrate, who is at least somewhat insulated from law enforcement
331
pressures.
Moreover, to ensure that the decision to cooperate is
made intelligently, the decision-maker should be required to inform
the vulnerable potential informant of the benefits of cooperation and
the sentences she might face should she not cooperate. Finally, the
decision-maker should be obliged to find that probable cause exists
to believe that the potential informant committed the crime for
which leniency is promised before approving any cooperation
agreement.
Mental health issues present detection and line-drawing problems
that are not present in the juvenile context, however. Unlike age,
which can be ascertained generally on sight and to a certainty with
minimal investigation, mental health issues can be difficult for

voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. CAL. PENAL CODE § 701.5(c). Other jurisdictions
should not dictate such extraneous considerations.
330. The use of the voluntary, knowing, and intelligent standard is appropriate
here, given the similarities between cooperation agreements and plea bargains. In
the plea bargaining context, the defendant’s guilty plea must be voluntary, knowing,
and intelligent because it involves a waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.
Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005). Though the decision to cooperate
does not involve a de jure waiver of constitutional rights, the cooperation agreement
often supplants the formalized criminal justice system, particularly when an
agreement is reached without the filing of formal charges. The informant essentially
concedes her guilt on the threatened charges and accepts the required cooperation
as part of the appropriate punishment, obviously without a jury trial and usually
without consultation with counsel. See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text
(discussing tactics employed by police officers, outside of the presence of a judge or
counsel, to attempt to gain cooperation from an informant). Thus, agreeing to
cooperate involves a de facto waiver of these rights. Of course, the informant may at
any point stop cooperating, face criminal charges, and once again be entitled to the
rights enjoyed by other criminal defendants.
Consequently, a cooperation
agreement is not a legal waiver and all such agreements need not be tested under a
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent standard. But when concerns about coercion
and lack of knowledge are heightened because of the vulnerabilities of the civilian at
issue, the standard used to judge plea bargains is useful to address those concerns.
Moreover, the familiarity of judges with this standard will allow them to apply it
consistently in cooperation cases.
331. See supra notes 269–78 and accompanying text (describing the pressure on
law enforcement agents to dispose of cases expeditiously and how this may translate
into a lack of concern for the best interests of informants).
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332

untrained laypersons to detect. Moreover, individuals with mental
health issues often try to hide those issues out of embarrassment or
333
fear.
Meanwhile, law enforcement training on the identification
and treatment of individuals with mental health issues is inconsistent
334
across jurisdictions.
Consequently, crafting a bright-line rule
between those individuals with mental health issues who can
voluntarily agree to cooperate and those who are unable to do so is
335
impractical.
Rather, the only feasible approach is a flexible one that requires a
closer examination of those potential informants who are at risk of
acting involuntarily or unknowingly as a result of mental illness or
retardation. With this in mind, law enforcement agents should be
required to seek court approval for the use of any informant whom
they reasonably believe may suffer from mental illness or mental
retardation that substantially impacts her ability to agree to cooperate
intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily. Once alerted to law
enforcement concerns, a neutral magistrate should then be
empowered to engage in fact-finding that might include a discussion
with the potential informant and consultation with psychologists or
social workers with mental health experience. Ultimately, law
enforcement should use an individual as an informant only if the
court determines that the informant can agree to cooperate
intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily.
Requiring law enforcement to refer to the court all potential
informants about whom they have substantial concerns is easier for
untrained law enforcement than applying a bright-line rule. But for
332. Bruce J. Winick, The Supreme Court’s Evolving Death Penalty Jurisprudence: Severe
Mental Illness as the Next Frontier, 50 B.C. L. REV. 785, 822–23 (2009).
333. James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 430–31 (1985).
334. See Camille A. Nelson, Racializing Disability, Disabling Race: Policing Race and
Mental Status, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 2 (2010) (noting that police receive little
training on how to deal with mentally impaired defendants); Natalie Pifer, Note, Is
Life the Same as Death?: Implications of Graham v. Florida, Roper v. Simmons, and
Atkins v. Virginia on Life Without Parole Sentences for Juvenile and Mentally Retarded
Offenders, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1495, 1527–28 (2010) (explaining that few states’
police departments have training programs on the special challenges posed by
mentally handicapped defendants). This is true even though a substantial
percentage of criminals suffer from mental health issues of some kind. See America’s
Law Enforcement and Mental Health Project, Pub. L. No. 106-515, § 2, 114 Stat.
2399, 2399 (2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 379ii) (reporting data from a Bureau of
Justice Statistics report that sixteen percent of inmates in state prisons and local jails
suffer from mental illness).
335. Of course, there will be some potential informants whose mental health
issues clearly preclude them from being effective informants. Given law enforcement
interests in effectiveness and efficiency, there is no need for a rule making such
individuals ineligible to cooperate.
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it to be effective, it requires “buy-in” from agents: if they believe that
court review is merely an impediment to law enforcement, they will
avoid it in all but the most obvious cases and thus undermine the
goals of the reform. For this reason, law enforcement agents also
must be trained to recognize that their interest in obtaining arrests
and convictions converges with society’s interest in protecting the
336
mentally ill and mentally handicapped.
Specifically, the same issues that interfere with the capacity of a
potential informant to cooperate knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily also impact her ability to be a useful informant. For
instance, a potential informant who is vulnerable to coercion due to
mental illness or handicap also would be more likely to fabricate
337
information to gain the approval of law enforcement.
Similarly,
delusional or paranoid informants are likely to provide useless
information as they may have difficulty distinguishing fantasy from
338
reality. Helping law enforcement recognize that their interests are
synchronous with society’s will foster the realization that the court’s
involvement is not merely a roadblock to an effective investigation
and enhance compliance.
3.

Drug-addicted informants
Drug-addicted informants present similar challenges.
Police
training on the detection of drug addiction and drug use is
339
inconsistent.
And addicts have strong incentives to keep their
addiction a secret, including the desire to cooperate to “work off”
any charges and remain out of jail. Nevertheless, drug addicts are
340
well-known by law enforcement to be unreliable informants. Thus,
336. An alternative, or perhaps additional, reform might impose some sort of
sanction on those agents who fail to comply with the requirement of court review. I
do not advocate for this proposal, however, because sanctions on the police are often
politically unfeasible and under-enforced.
337. See Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions:
Risk Factors and
Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 21 (2010) (noting the tendency of the
mentally handicapped to desire to please persons in positions of authority); Allison
D. Redlich et al., Self-Reported False Confessions and False Guilty Pleas Among Offenders
with Mental Illness, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 79, 81–82 (2010) (observing how inherent
vulnerabilities put individuals with mental illness at an especially high risk of making
a false confession).
338. See MADINGER, supra note 1, at 189 (“Someone who is paranoid and
delusional about imagined plots or contrived schemes is not going to be a very
successful informant.”).
339. See Joseph Osmond, Note, The Plight of the Unsuspected Drug User: A Police
Officer’s Take on Arizona v. Gant, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1257, 1273 (2010) (discussing
the cost and infrequency of training police in drug use recognition).
340. See MADINGER, supra note 1, at 187–88 (discussing the unreliability of
addicted informants); MALLORY, supra note 1, at 25 (noting that many jurisdictions
recognize that drug-addicted informants are less reliable).
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society’s interests again align with those of law enforcement, and the
approach to handling drug-addicted informants should be similar to
that of the mentally ill. Namely, the police should be required to
obtain court approval before using any informant whom they
reasonably believe suffers from a drug addiction that substantially
impacts her ability to agree to cooperate intelligently, knowingly, and
voluntarily. Similarly, training should again be used to reinforce the
synchronicity between law enforcement’s interest in accurate arrests
and convictions and society’s interest in protecting addicts.
C. Remedying Information Asymmetries
As discussed above, all criminal informants are vulnerable to
coercion due to information asymmetries not of their own making.
Specifically, they are unable to evaluate the claims made by law
enforcement agents about the potential charges and sentences they
might face if they do not cooperate and the potential benefits they
might receive by cooperating. Furthermore, they cannot evaluate the
341
enforceability of the promises made by law enforcement.
One potential solution to these information asymmetries would be
to expand the previous proposal and require court involvement in
342
the use of any informant. Doing so would remedy the information
asymmetries at issue. On the other hand, given the sheer number of
informants used by law enforcement, it also would almost certainly
overburden the court system. Moreover, increasing the number of
individuals who know the identity of a potential informant would
increase the possibility that her cooperation would become known,
thus endangering the informant.
A more moderate step would be to require consent from the
relevant prosecutor’s office prior to the use of any criminal
informant. Specifically, a representative of the relevant prosecutor’s
office with authority to bind the office would assess the case against
the potential informant, provide a non-binding determination of the
charges she might face and the sentence she could receive, and
commit the office to providing a specified benefit should the
341. See supra notes 185–94 and accompanying text (describing how law
enforcement officers may make promises to informants without authority, and how
informants lack access to the information needed to evaluate such promises).
342. Another possible solution would be to require police to tell potential
informants the truth. Though attractive in its simplicity, such a requirement would
run contrary to police practice and recent precedent, which permit and even
condone police lying to suspected criminals. See Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil:
Police Lying in Interrogations, 28 CONN. L. REV. 425, 427–32, 451–56 (1996) (describing
the types of lies police tell to coerce informants and detailing evidence of judicial
tolerance for police deception).
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individual agree to cooperate. The results of the prosecutor’s
assessment would be reduced to writing and shared with the potential
informant.
The benefits of this requirement from the standpoint of protecting
the informant are obvious: the potential informant would no longer
be forced to rely on police assertions about her guilt and the possible
sentence she might face; instead, she would receive an enforceable,
written promise of a benefit from the relevant prosecutor should she
343
cooperate.
This procedure would also minimize the risk that the
informant’s identity might be disclosed, and the informant’s safety
thus compromised, by limiting disclosure of the informant’s identity
to the recruiting officer and a single member of the prosecutor’s
office designated for this task.
Moreover, the procedure is not unduly burdensome on police or
prosecutors. While the proposal does deprive individual officers of
the discretion to recruit informants without outside interference, law
enforcement experts on informant recruitment and handling do not
condone unfettered discretion and already recommend that
344
informant recruitment be subject to supervisory approval.
Meanwhile, determining the existence of probable cause is a routine
task for a prosecutor who often must assess the validity of arrests and
the prospects of winning cases at trial. Similarly, the task of making a
non-binding assessment of the sentence that an arrestee might face is
part and parcel of the plea bargaining process. Of course, requiring
prosecutors to make a binding promise to a potential informant will
impose costs on society as those promises are then enforced, but such
is the price that society must pay to vindicate the autonomy of its
members.
D. Training Police and Informants to Minimize Risk
The safety interests of informants can best be protected through
better training of both police and informants. Often, harm to
informants can be traced back to inadequate training of police,
either in how to safeguard the identity of informants or in how to
343. Though the prosecutor’s assessment of the possible charges and sentence
that the informant might face if she chooses not to cooperate would be non-binding,
the prosecutor would be constrained to be honest in her assessment by her narrow
obligation as an attorney not to lie to third-parties, see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2010), and her more general duty as a prosecutor to truth, see
Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309,
313–14 (2001) (arguing that a prosecutor has a “legal and ethical duty to promote
truth” and describing the scope of that duty).
344. See MALLORY, supra note 1, at 113 (describing how supervisory approval and
consultation with legal counsel is required prior to working with an informant).
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plan operations so as to provide the maximum possible protection to
345
the informants who are involved. Police officers, particularly those
involved in areas of law enforcement in which the use of informants
is common, should receive additional training so as to minimize
unnecessary risks to informant safety.
Informants also receive little or no training in how to handle
346
potentially dangerous situations.
The threat of criminal sanctions
should they fail to satisfy their police handlers often causes
informants to remain in a dangerous situation longer than is wise.
To counteract this incentive, informants should receive at least
rudimentary training in how to recognize when they are in a
dangerous situation and how to remove themselves before they are
harmed. Moreover, police should be instructed not to punish
informants who exit dangerous situations prior to obtaining the
evidence sought.
E. Including Informants in Existing Workers’ Compensation Schemes
Even with better training for police and informants, police still will
have substantial discretion in their use of informants. This discretion
will be exercised in manner responsive to internal and external
347
pressures to maximize arrests and convictions.
These pressures,
combined with the generally dim view of criminal informants held by
law enforcement, suggest that police will inevitably sacrifice
informant safety for the opportunity to increase arrest and
convictions rates. Incentives are therefore needed to encourage
police to protect informant safety. Such incentives would most
reasonably take the form of some combination of internal law
enforcement regulations and the potential for external sanctions.
Unfortunately, internal regulations relating to informants have
proven to be ineffective at shaping police conduct with respect to
348
informants.
345. See, e.g., ACLU STUDY, supra note 1, at 33 (finding that approximately sixtythree percent of surveyed officers reported receiving no training in the handing of
informants); John Riley, Expert: Cops Put His Life in Danger, NEWSDAY, Sept. 22, 2011,
at A41 (reporting, in the case of two officers sued for negligently revealing the
identity of an informant who later was killed, that the officers received no formal
training in how to handle and protect confidential informants).
346. See, e.g., Hoffman’s Attorneys Release Statement Critical of TPD, TALLAHASSEE
DEMOCRAT, May 11, 2008, at 6A (reporting that an informant killed during an
arranged drug deal received no training from police).
347. See supra notes 269–73 and accompanying text (describing the institutional
job pressures, such as clearance rates, that cause law enforcement officers to
increasingly rely on informants).
348. See supra note 273 and accompanying text (noting that the national law
enforcement agency, the FBI, has been criticized for failing to follow the DOJ
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This leaves external sanctions as the most practical means of
deterring police from unnecessarily endangering informants. But
what form should these sanctions take? The consensus among
criminologists is that the certainty of punishment is the most critical
349
factor in deterring misconduct. This being so, the current threat of
external sanctions is unlikely to deter police from unduly
endangering informant interests because the possibility of recovery
under a tort theory depends largely on the informant’s ability to
establish egregious misconduct; as a result, damages are awarded only
350
Such uncertainty in the imposition
in the most exceptional cases.
of sanctions against police, even if the sanctions themselves are
351
severe, deters very little misconduct.
While lowering the standard
for civil liability would provide greater certainty of punishment, and
thus greater deterrence, doing so would require either a wholesale
change in substantive due process jurisprudence or the political will
352
to open law enforcement to substantial civil liability.
To be frank,
neither seems particularly likely.
Workers’ compensation, however, already provides a regime by
which individuals who are injured while working are awarded a set,
353
modest compensation regardless of fault.
The theory is
straightforward:
workers’ compensation benefits employees by
providing a streamlined, efficient way for them to recover for injuries
relating to their employment, while employers benefit from lower
354
and certain damages awards.
As a legislative matter, extending
workers’ compensation benefits to criminal informants would require
only the amendment of the definition of “employee” in the relevant
states to include informants whose services are provided in exchange
355
for a promise of leniency from law enforcement.
Guidelines intended to enhance the safety and protections afforded to informants).
349. Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Not the Crime but the Cover-Up: A DeterrenceBased Rationale for the Premeditation-Deliberation Formula, 86 IND. L.J. 879, 907 (2011).
350. See supra notes 281–99 and accompanying text (discussing the significant
legal hurdles facing the plaintiff in a civil suit against law enforcement).
351. See Guyora Binder, Victims and the Significance of Causing Harm, 28 PACE L. REV.
713, 717 (2008) (describing the theory that “moderate but certain punishment
deters more effectively than severe but uncertain punishment”).
352. In the rare cases where informant claims survive, jury awards tend to be large.
See, e.g., Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 640–41 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(amending an award of $70 million in compensatory damages and $27 million in
punitive damages to a total award of just over $1 million in a case where the
informant was murdered while attempting a drug purchase).
353. Workers’ compensation schemes exist in every jurisdiction. Jason M.
Solomon, What Is Civil Justice?, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 317, 332 (2010).
354. Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers’
Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775, 800–01 (1982).
355. Narrow tailoring the definition of “employee” already is the rule in workers’
compensation statutes. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 440.02(15) (2011) (setting out explicit
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For the purposes of deterring police from taking unnecessary risks
with informant safety, workers’ compensation is an excellent fit. The
cost to law enforcement agencies of obtaining workers’ compensation
insurance for informants would depend upon the number of
356
informants they employ and their track record of past injuries. As a
result, law enforcement agencies would be incentivized to minimize
357
Because the increased
the risk of physical harm to informants.
costs would apply agency-wide, so too would reforms of informant
policies, thus widening the scope of reforms to an extent unlikely
with substantial but scattershot jury awards. Finally, this approach
properly places the incentive and responsibility for reform on law
enforcement agencies, which are most capable of formulating
effective policies.
One additional point is worth noting. Folding criminal informants
into existing workers’ compensation schemes will do little to deter
the most flagrant police misconduct that threatens the safety of
358
informants.
By allowing certain low-level recovery for harms
suffered by informants, the workers’ compensation scheme will
encourage law enforcement agencies to adopt policies that impose
low-cost limitations on the most dangerous practices. These policies
are likely to influence officers who tend to follow the rules, but are
unlikely to deter extremely reckless or intentional endangerment of
informants, activities which typically are already forbidden. Many
states do exclude from workers’ compensation schemes intentional
359
torts by the employer, but these exceptions are construed narrowly
and often require a finding of actual intent to harm by the
360
employer.
Even if egregious law enforcement misconduct were
excluded from the workers’ compensation scheme, the informant
361
would be left to rely on uncertain tort recovery. The inability of this
definitions of the term “employee,” including what conduct the term does not
encompass); MICH. COMP. LAWS . § 418.161 (2011) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(2)
(2011) (same).
356. See 9 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
LAW § 150.06 (2011) (noting that workman’s insurance rates are calculated based on
the number of employees who receive compensation).
357. Agencies also may decide to use fewer informants. While this would harm
the interest of potential informants in avoiding punishment, that is not an interest
that society ought to protect. See supra notes 111–15 and accompanying text
(discussing the harm to society incident to an informant’s desire to avoid
punishment).
358. See Epstein, supra note 354, at 814 (“Unlike ordinary negligence, intentional
harms introduce an element of moral hazard that is very difficult to control by a set
of rules designed for accidents.”).
359. 6 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 356, § 103.01.
360. Id. § 103.03.
361. See supra notes 281–99 and accompanying text (discussing the legal hurdles
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solution to deter the worst misconduct should not be fatal to the
plan, however. Rather, it is part of a larger struggle to ultimately
deter such wrongdoing.
CONCLUSION
The preceding discussion has attempted to remedy the oversight of
scholars who have largely ignored the interests of informants by
focusing on those interests exclusively. But informant interests do
not exist in a vacuum, and obvious questions arise from such a singleminded focus. Among them, one might well ask why, in an era of
limited government resources, should resources be devoted to
protecting the interests of active criminal informants?
More
specifically, why should protecting these informants be prioritized
over other pressing law enforcement concerns?
Answering these questions, important as they are, exceeds the
scope of this Article. However, it is worth noting that the proposals
made herein would address, at least in part, many of the concerns
raised by scholars about the broader societal implications of
widespread informant use. For instance, scholars have argued that
informant use negatively impacts policing by allowing investigations
362
to be driven by informants rather than law enforcement agents.
Similarly, regular interaction with informants can lead to police
363
corruption.
Both of these problems would be curtailed at least
somewhat by requiring prosecutorial involvement in the recruitment
of informants.
The use of informants also can have corrosive effects on the highcrime communities in which they are most often used and the
relationship between the police and those communities. Releasing
criminals to inform on their neighbors’ activities weakens social ties,
increases crime, and communicates to members of high-crime
364
communities that crime in those communities will not be punished.
Moreover, civilians often view the recruitment and use of informants
365
as coercive and exploitative.
These concerns, in turn, give rise to
civilian distrust of police, a reduced willingness by law-abiding citizens
that impede and generally prevent an informant from recovery against law
enforcement in a civil suit).
362. See NATAPOFF, supra note 13, at 32–33 (describing the ways in which the use of
informants “flips the law enforcement endeavor on its head”).
363. Id. at 32.
364. See Natapoff, supra note 16, at 691–92 (describing how a culture of informing
can breed distrust and fear in communities, breaking down social ties and
relationships).
365. See ACLU STUDY, supra note 1, at 52–55 (describing the types of corrupt
practices employed by law enforcement in recruiting informants).
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to cooperate, and an adversarial relationship between law
366
By
enforcement and the communities they are meant to serve.
slightly increasing the transaction costs involved in recruiting a new
informant, the proposals contained herein will reduce the number of
informants used and thus ameliorate the sense that informants are
infiltrating high-crime communities. In addition, restrictions on the
use of particularly vulnerable informants and guarantees that
informants must agree to cooperate knowingly and voluntarily will
counter the impression that police agents exploit informants. The
ultimate result would hopefully be an increase in trust and
cooperation between law enforcement and communities.
Finally, the use of informants may ultimately undermine the
deterrent effect of criminal sanctions if the perceived benefits of
cooperation to the criminal outweigh the increased risk that an
367
informant will detect their crimes.
The obvious solution to this
problem is to reduce the rate at which informants are recruited, but
such reforms are unlikely to be implemented internally by law
368
enforcement.
Once again, by increasing the transaction cost of
informant recruitment, the proposals set forth herein would require
law enforcement to enact such a reduction.
But these answers to the question of why we should protect
informants allow society to do the right thing for the wrong reasons.
Ultimately, society should protect informants because informants are
vulnerable members of society meriting protection according to
widely-accepted norms. Often their vulnerabilities are unchosen, and
some arise from their decision to engage in activities that benefit
society. This compels society’s protection.

366. See Rich, supra note 12 (manuscript at 20) (explaining how the origins of the
“Stop Snitching” movement are rooted in racism in policing and the negative
experiences with law enforcement common to many residents of high-crime
communities).
367. See Baer, supra note 129, at 963 (explaining that, if criminals presume they
will be able to reduce consequences through cooperation, they will be more willing
to commit crimes).
368. See id. at 964 (noting how law enforcement agencies will be unlikely to reduce
the use of informants where such use “impact[s] all-important conviction and arrest
statistics, which are the source of resources and prestige”).

